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Digital-Self Ownership: A Publicity-rights Framework for 
Determining Employee Social Media Rights  
Susan Park* and Patricia Sánchez Abril** 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine an up-and-coming company hires you as one of its first employees. Passionate about 
your employer, you put in long hours doing everything from marketing to accounting to event 
planning. You are also proud of your employer’s product, so you begin to publicize it to your 
friends through your social network accounts. (In fact, the company’s founder is also one of your 
Facebook friends.) You tell your friends about the product launch, invite them to marketing 
events, and eventually blog about your industry, amassing a significant social media following 
while creating buzz about your employer. But one day, during layoffs unrelated to your own 
efforts, you are fired. As you walk out the door, your supervisor asks you to return the office 
keys, your parking pass, and . . . administrative rights to your social media profiles. Can this be? 
The term “social media” encompasses any online platform that allows individuals to 
communicate, create content, and interact socially.1 Social media can include blogs, wikis, 
podcasts, photos and video sharing, virtual worlds, and social networking sites such as LinkedIn, 
Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter.2 For individuals, social media can be the digital representation 
of the self online. Social media profiles are fora for communication, self-expression, identity 
creation, and relationship-building in front of audiences of few or many. The phenomenon of 
social media—and its use in business—is less than a decade old.3 It is thus no surprise that both 
normative and legal questions regularly test its limits. 
The ubiquity and accessibility of social media has proven enticing to businesses and 
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1 See, e.g., Simeon Edosomwan et al., The History of Social Media and Its Impact on Business, 16 J. APPLIED 
MGMT. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP (2011); CHRISTIAN FUCHS, SOCIAL MEDIA: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (2013).  
2 Alexander Naito, Comment, A Fourth Amendment Status Update: Applying Constitutional Privacy Protection to 
Employees’ Social Media Use, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 849, 858 (2012). 
3 The three principal social media sites—Twitter, LinkedIn, and Facebook—were all founded between 2002 and 
2006. Sarah Phillips, A Brief History of Facebook, THE GUARDIAN (July 25, 2007, 5:29 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2007/jul/25/media.newmedia; Charles Arthur, How Twitter was Born: The 
First 140 Users, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 11, 2010, 8:14 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/blog/2010/jan/11/twitter-first-140-users-history; A Brief History of 
LinkedIn, LINKEDIN, https://ourstory.linkedin.com/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2016). 
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institutions, which increasingly use it as a low-cost marketing, sales, and branding tool. The 
presence of businesses on social media is thus growing rapidly. Recent studies show that the 
overwhelming majority of Fortune 500 companies are active on social media: ninety-seven 
percent have a presence on LinkedIn.4 Over eighty percent have corporate Facebook accounts 
and eighty-three percent use Twitter at least once every thirty days.5 These trends mirror those of 
smaller businesses, whose success often depends on the strength of their relationships with 
customers and other constituencies.6 
But the mere existence of a social media presence cannot alone anthropomorphize an 
institution, or cultivate valuable relationships. Individuals—employees and agents—work to 
create and advertise the institutional identity and create relationships through their own posts, 
content, and management of complex networks of individual and business relationships. 
Although the practice of social media management is ubiquitous, the work of these modern-day 
Cyranos is caught in a blurred7 and legally undefined territory where the personal melds with the 
professional. Sometimes, employees create the company’s profile as individuals, becoming 
personally bound to user contracts with the social network providers. These employees may 
control the password and access to the company account. In other cases, employees may use 
their own profiles to boost their company’s notoriety alongside their own, or write their own 
industry-related blogs whose goodwill spills over to the author’s employer. Or companies might 
encourage employees to foster their own social media presence to enhance professional 
connections and reputation. The result, in physical terms, is both a personal calling card and a 
company billboard, sharing the attention of a coveted audience.8  
When employers and employees who have shared a social media profile part ways, who 
retains the right to control the Twitter feed, the Facebook page, or the blog? More specifically, 
who keeps the social media audience?9 What legal interest, if any, should a person obtain in the 
                                                 
4 Nora Ganlm Barnes & Ava M. Lescault, The 2014 Fortune 500 and Social Media: LinkedIn Dominates as Use of 
Newer Tools Explodes, CHARLTON COLL. OF BUS. CTR. FOR MKTG. RESEARCH, UNIV. OF MASS. DARTMOUTH 
(2014), http://www.umassd.edu/cmr/socialmediaresearch/2014fortune500/. The University of Massachusetts 
Dartmouth Center for Marketing Research surveyed Fortune 500 companies recognized as of May 2014 to compile 
data on company usage of social media platforms including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Google+, Foursquare, 
Pinterest, YouTube, and others. Id. 
5 Id.   
6 A recent survey revealed that the majority of small businesses have an online presence, which they use primarily 
for business networking. NAT’L SMALL BUS. ASSOC., 2013 SMALL BUSINESS TECHNOLOGY SURVEY (2013), 
http://www.nsba.biz/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Technology-Survey-2013.pdf.  
7 Several scholars have described the online convergence of personal and work-related as “blurred.” See Lauren 
Gelman, Privacy, Free Speech, and “Blurry-Edged” Social Networks, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1315, 1316 (2009); see also 
Patricia Sánchez Abril et al., Blurred Boundaries: Social Media Privacy and the Twenty-First-Century Employee, 49 
AM. BUS. L.J. 63, 95 (2012); Robert Sprague, Invasion of the Social Networks: Blurring the Line Between Personal 
Life and the Employment Relationship, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 1, 12 n.72 (2011).   
8 It is worth noting that people use social media for many reasons, including communication, companionship, and 
connectivity. This article focuses narrowly on those accounts whose primary or secondary purpose is to promote a 
business or a professional. 
9 For ease of reference, we refer to the act of attracting and amassing a following through social media, with the 
intention to garner attention, reputation, or an audience, as social media audience management. While different 
websites describe their participants differently—as friends, followers, or connections—we selected “audience” as a 
website-neutral descriptor that captures the aim of those who promote a business on social media. 




social network of virtual friends that person has amassed while on the job? 
In the absence of a clear agreement, the employer is likely to demand the ongoing right to 
control communications with present and potential customers. The employee, on the other hand, 
may wish to maintain the relationships, and, in some cases, the digital persona that she has 
nurtured. Relationships carry value—and demand hard work to cultivate and maintain. But can a 
digital self and the cultivated relationships ever be property? What rights, if any, should attach to 
this new type of amassed virtual audience? 
  Disputes over post-employment retention of social media are increasingly common.10 For 
employees, interests range from the dignitary (control of their virtual identities and goodwill) to 
the financial (ability to reap the benefits accruing from their amassed audience). Employers, on 
the other hand, have legitimate interests in promoting their brands, maintaining access to their 
customers, and keeping their employees’ work product. However, the law does not provide clear 
guidance,11 and relatively little scholarly work has been written about this issue.12 As a result, 
employers and employees face undue uncertainty when it comes to ownership of social media 
content and audiences.  
This article posits two reasons for the generalized unease. The first is the lack of an 
established legal rubric addressing employee social media rights. The second, and related, factor 
is an overly tentative (and sometimes erroneous) conceptualization of social media’s existing 
norms, the work exerted in cultivating an audience, its value, and the reputational and financial 
harms that can ensue when a digital forum is unjustifiably usurped from its rightful holder. This 
article addresses the legal and normative issues in turn and concludes with a way forward. We 
argue that, with few exceptions, individuals should be entitled to protection against those who 
seek to misappropriate their work, personae, and goodwill on social media for economic gain. It 
proposes a multifactor analysis that is protective of employee personality yet considerate of the 
employer’s reasonable business interests.  
Part I explores the existing law. First, it examines recent illustrative court cases regarding 
the post-employment control of social media audiences.13 Analysis of these cases reveals that 
this legal question does not fit neatly into conventional interpretations or areas of law. Is this a 
matter of property law? Or perhaps contract law? Do we engage the law of trade secrets to 
                                                 
10 See Carrie Pixler Ryerson & John Balitis, Jr., Social Media’s Lessons: Employers Adapt as Viewers, Publishers, 
48 ARIZ. ATT’Y., Apr. 2012, at 17, 17 (“As more and more employers are using social media for their own gain, a 
new controversy has emerged. Employers now are embroiled in litigation against former employees over the issue of 
who owns social media pages and accounts: the employer or the employee.”); Hugh McLaughlin, Comment, You’re 
Fired: Pack Everything but Your Social Media Passwords, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 87, 90–91 (2015). 
11 See Zoe Argento, Whose Social Network Account? A Trade Secret Approach to Allocating Rights, 19 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 201, 205 (2013) (“This is a new area with no clear legal framework.”); Thomas C. 
Mahlum & Andrew J. Pieper, From the Experts: Company vs. Employee Ownership of Social Media Assets, CORP. 
COUNSEL (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.robinskaplan.com/~/media/PDFs/From%20the%20Experts-
Company%20vs%20Employee%20Ownership%20of%20Social%20Media%20Assets.pdf (“The ‘ownership’ of 
relationships formed and maintained by a company’s employees, however, remains something of an open question, 
and is largely in the eye of the beholder.”). 
12 See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 10; Argento, supra note 11; Tiffany A. Miao, Note, Access Denied: How Social 
Media Accounts Fall Outside the Scope of Intellectual Property Law and Into the Realm of the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1017 (2013); Courtney J. Mitchell, Note, Keep Your 
Friends Close: A Framework for Addressing Rights to Social Media Contacts, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1459 (2014). 
13 See infra notes 16–19. 
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resolve these issues? Or is intellectual property or tort law better suited to address them? We 
assert that the conundrum surrounding the applicable law is due in part to a lack of understanding 
of the exercise and value of social media in the business context. To that end, Part II analyzes 
social media through the lens of social science and business, describing it with five fundamental 
tenets that can ultimately inform its legal protection. Social media audience management is a 
creative, dynamic, and generative process whose fruits—networked relationships—can be 
inextricably interwoven with the individual. Given this intimate tie to personhood and the 
complexity of extricating the personal from the professional, Part III proposes a multifactor 
framework grounded in a theory of publicity rights to guide its resolution. With roots in both 
privacy and property, publicity rights protect the unjustified commercialization or exploitation of 
another’s name, likeness, reputation, accomplishments, or endorsement.14 The right recognizes 
that intangible fruits of one’s persona carry value, which must be protected in the vein of 
property.15 Since social media is the dominant disseminator of publicity today and it offers 
widespread notoriety to many, adopting a framework informed by the well-established law of 
publicity rights is both logical and desirable. 
I. THE UNTETHERED LAW OF EMPLOYEE RIGHTS IN SOCIAL MEDIA 
Given the ubiquity of social media as a marketing tool and its blurring of personal and 
professional, it is hardly surprising that employees have begun to defend their rights and 
creations in social media. Four recent cases—PhoneDog v. Kravitz,16 Eagle v. Morgan,17 
Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Group,18 and Mattocks v. Black Entertainment Television 
LLC19—elucidate this burgeoning legal issue in diverse industries and on varied social media 
sites. In this section, we first briefly discuss the cases and their holdings. We then examine in 
more detail the various legal claims and arguments put forth by the litigants. Their analysis sheds 
light on the current confusion regarding applicable law and uncovers some fundamental 
misconceptions about social media, both of which must be clarified for a coherent solution to 
emerge.   
A. Four Representative Cases 
In PhoneDog v. Kravitz, the plaintiff PhoneDog.com is a website that provides interactive news 
                                                 
14 See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953); Ettore v. Philco Television 
Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 484 (3d Cir. 1956). 
15 According to the Restatement, “[o]ne who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another 
is subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (AM. LAW 
INST. 1977). The comments also make clear that “the right created by [§ 652C] is in the nature of a property 
right.” Id. § 652 cmt. a; see also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) (“[T]he State’s 
interest [in permitting a ‘right of publicity’] is closely analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law, focusing 
on the right of the individual to reap the reward of his endeavors . . . .”). 
16 No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011). 
17 No. 11-4303, 2013 WL 943350 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013). 
18 No. 10 C 7811, 2014 WL 812401 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2014). 
19 43 F. Supp. 3d 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2014). 




and reviews about cellular phones and mobile devices. In April 2006, PhoneDog hired Noah 
Kravitz as a product reviewer and video blogger.20 In this capacity, Kravitz was charged with 
submitting written and video content, which PhoneDog then disseminated to its users through a 
variety of online mediums, including its website and Twitter account.21 As part of his 
employment, Kravitz was given a Twitter account named “@PhoneDog_Noah” for which he 
created a password.22 In his four years with PhoneDog, Kravitz accumulated approximately 
17,000 Twitter followers.23  
When Kravitz resigned in 2010, PhoneDog demanded he hand over the use of his Twitter 
account, which he had popularized during his tenure at PhoneDog.24 But PhoneDog did not have 
a policy regarding retention of social media accounts.25 Kravitz refused, and, in protest, 
continued to use the account to communicate with his followers but changed the handle from 
“@PhoneDog_Noah” to “@noahkravitz.”26 PhoneDog claimed that the Twitter password was a 
trade secret, and its continued unauthorized use was misappropriation, and sued Kravitz on four 
claims: 1) misappropriation of trade secrets; 2) conversion; and 3) intentional and 4) negligent 
interference with prospective economic advantage.27 Could a Twitter password be a trade 
secret—a proprietary interest capable of being misappropriated by its own creator?  
  Employee Kravitz argued that the password to the Twitter account could not be a trade 
secret because it was neither valuable nor secret. Passwords, he argued, could carry no actual or 
economic value because they merely allow individuals to login to an account to view 
information. Moreover, Kravitz himself created the password, and his employer made no attempt 
to secure its secrecy.28  
  On Kravitz’s motion to dismiss, the court dismissed the claims for intentional and 
negligent interference, but allowed the claims for conversion and misappropriation of trade 
secrets to go forward, accepting (for purposes of ruling on the motion to dismiss) that under 
certain circumstances a Twitter password could be a trade secret.29 The parties eventually entered 
into a confidential settlement that allowed Kravitz to maintain sole custody of the Twitter 
account and its thousands of followers.30 The case settled amidst public confusion and 
                                                 
20 PhoneDog, 2011 WL 5415612 at *1. 
21 Id. 
22 Id.  
23 Id.  
24 Id. 
25 Id. at *4. 
26 Id. at *1. 
27 Id.  
28 Id. at *6.  
29 Id. at *7–10; see also Argento, supra note 11, at 266 (noting that “in the trade secret context, a court must 
carefully scrutinize the circumstances and the objective manifestations of each party to determine the nature of the 
agreement”); David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are Increasingly Important, 27 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1091, 1109 & n. 106 (2012) (suggesting that new technologies and trends can cause the scope of trade 
secret law to shrink). 
30 Jessica Mendelson, Former PhoneDog Employee Off the Hook in Closely Watched Trade Secrets Spat, TRADING 
SECRETS (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.tradesecretslaw.com/2012/12/articles/trade-secrets/2351; Chris Taylor, Writer 
Sued for His Twitter Followers Settles Case, MASHABLE (Dec. 3, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/12/03/noah-
6 Vol. 53  /  American Business Law Journal 
 
speculation, leaving the law unsettled.  
In Eagle v. Morgan,31 Linda Eagle was an executive and founder of Edcomm, Inc., an 
education and business training company focused on the banking industry. Well-known in her 
industry, Eagle was often published and quoted on professional matters. In 2009, Edcomm 
decided to begin using a LinkedIn profile as a sales and marketing tool.32 At the enthusiastic 
urging of Edcomm’s then-CEO, Eagle “created her own LinkedIn account using her Edcomm e-
mail address,” engaging on the site on both her personal and her company’s behalf.33 Through 
this social network, Eagle promoted the company’s services, fostered her reputation, stayed 
connected with friends and family, and built social and professional relationships.34 Eagle’s 
assistant had access to her account for the purpose of managing and updating its content.35   
LinkedIn’s User Agreement made explicit that users owned their accounts and were 
individually bound to the User Agreement, regardless of whether their use was on behalf of an 
employer.36 Although Edcomm neither required employees to use Linkedin nor paid for its 
employees’ LinkedIn accounts, it provided them certain guidelines as to posted content.37 
However, these guidelines did not address the company’s right to access or control the 
accounts.38  
After Edcomm was sold, the new owners terminated Eagle and hired Sandi Morgan in 
her place.39 Edcomm then accessed Eagle’s LinkedIn account and changed the password and the 
account profile to display Morgan’s name and photograph.40 For approximately two weeks, 
Eagle was locked out of what she believed to be “her” LinkedIn account, causing her to lose 
messages and feel that her virtual personality had been hijacked.41 During this time, an Internet 
search for Eagle’s name produced the LinkedIn account that bore Morgan’s name and likeness.42 
Although Edcomm returned the account to Eagle within a month, she sued her former company 
and the individuals involved for a medley of claims: (1) unauthorized use of name; (2) invasion 
of privacy by misappropriation of identity; (3) misappropriation of publicity; (4) identity theft; 
(5) conversion; (6) tortious interference with contract; (7) civil conspiracy; and (8) civil aiding 
and abetting.43 Was the nature of Eagle’s harm dignitary, proprietary, or both? What would be its 
                                                 
kravitz-lawsuit-twitter.  
31 No. 11-4303, 2013 WL 943350, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013). 
32 Id.  
33 Id.    
34 Id. 
35 Id. at *3. 
36 Id. at *1. 
37 Id. 
38 Id.  
39 Id. 
40 Id. at *3.   
41 See id. at *10. 
42 Id. at *3. 
43 Id. at *6. In an earlier 2012 decision in the case, the court dismissed the federal law claims alleging violation of 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (1986) (amending Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 




correspondent remedy? Under which of these assorted legal bases could Eagle recover? 
Following a non-jury trial, judgment was entered in favor of all of the individually named 
defendants.44 Edcomm was awarded judgment on the counts of identity theft, conversion, 
tortious interference with contract, civil conspiracy, and civil aiding and abetting,45 and the court 
dismissed Edcomm’s counterclaim that Eagle had actually misappropriated the LinkedIn account 
as her own.46  
  Eagle, did, however, succeed on her claims for unauthorized use of name (in violation of 
Pennsylvania law), misappropriation of publicity, and invasion of privacy by misappropriation of 
identity—a tort prohibiting both the commercial and noncommercial use of another’s image or 
likeness.47 The court acknowledged that Edcomm had improperly usurped Eagle’s digital 
persona to her detriment.48 The court reasoned that by virtue of the existence of her LinkedIn 
membership, Eagle had a contractual relationship with LinkedIn and noted that the LinkedIn 
User Agreement clearly indicated that the individual user controlled the account.49 By entering 
her account and changing her password, Edcomm had acted with purpose or intent to harm Eagle 
by preventing that relationship from continuing.50  
The court concluded that Eagle had proved tortious interference by her employer but 
failed to prove any damages with reasonable certainty.51 It noted that “[a]side from her own self-
serving testimony that she regularly maintained business through LinkedIn, Plaintiff failed to 
point to one contract, one client, one prospect, or one deal that could have been, but was not 
obtained during the period she did not have full access to her LinkedIn account.”52 
The court further held that even if Eagle “had made a showing of a ‘fair probability’ that 
she sustained some damages[,] . . . she failed to provide a reasonably fair basis for calculating 
such damages.”53 Although Eagle succeeded in her privacy cause of action, the court awarded 
neither compensatory nor punitive damages.54 Thus, even when a plaintiff has a valid cause of 
action in a post-employment social media dispute, it is not clear whether the plaintiff is limited to 
equitable remedies alone.  
                                                 
2102, 98 Stat. 1837, 2190 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(2)(c) (2012)), and the Lanham Act, 
Pub. L. No. 79–489, tit. VI, § 32, 60 Stat. 427, 437 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a)(1)(A) 
(2012)). See Eagle v Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2012 WL 4739436 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2012). 
44 Eagle, 2013 WL 943350, at *17. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at *16. 
47 Id. at *17. 
48 Id. at *13–16.  
49 Id. at *11.   
50 Id. 
51 Id. at *17. 
52 Id. at *13. 
53 Id. at *14. Eagle did present one witness to establish damages, but that witness was never properly qualified as an 
expert. Id. 
54 Id. at *17. 
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 In Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Group,55 Jill Maremont was employed as the 
Director of Marketing, Public Relations, and E-commerce at the Susan Fredman Design Group 
(SFDG).56 As part of her job, she wrote the “Designer Diaries: Tales from the Interior” blog hosted 
on the SFDG website.57 Through her personal Facebook and Twitter accounts, Maremont 
promoted SFDG by frequently posting links to her employer.58 At SFDG’s request, she created a 
company Facebook page.59 Per Facebook’s policy, a company page can only be created through a 
personal Facebook account.60 As a result of this policy, Maremont created and accessed SFDG’s 
company Facebook page required through her personal account.61 Maremont was also a frequent 
contributor on Twitter, on behalf of SFDG and on her own behalf.62 She stored various social 
media passwords on an electronic spreadsheet on an SFDG-owned computer.63 
Maremont was seriously injured in an automobile accident, which caused her to 
temporarily abandon her job and all social media communications.64 SFDG’s own marketing 
efforts continued in spite of Maremont’s absence.65 During Maremont’s convalescence, SFDG 
accessed and posted seventeen times from her Twitter account without her consent. Some 
postings notified readers that the account would be maintained by her temporary replacement.66 
Other messages were in the first person, giving readers the impression that she wrote them.67  
Maremont sued, alleging that SFDG’s actions violated: (1) the Lanham Act68 (false 
endorsement); (2) the Stored Communications Act69 (“SCA”); (3) the Illinois Right of Publicity 
                                                 
55 No. 10 C 7811, 2014 WL 812401 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2014) 
56 Id. at *1. 
57 Id. 
58 Id.  
59 Id. 
60 Set up A Page, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/business/learn/set-up-facebook-page/ (last visited Mar. 14, 
2016). 
61 Maremont, 2014 WL 812401, at *2. The parties contested whether or not Maremont made other employees 
administrators of the page (meaning they would not need to access her personal Facebook account to manage the 
company page). This factual question was left to the jury. Id. at *6. Giving access to a personal password would 
violate Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, which prohibits users from sharing passwords, 
allowing others to access the account, or transferring accounts to others without the written permission of Facebook. 
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last updated Jan. 30, 
2015).  
62 Maremont, 2014 WL 812401, at *1. 
63 Id. at *2. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. Maremont also claimed that SFDG accessed her personal Facebook page, but she was unable to provide any 
evidence to support her claim. Id.  
67 Id. at *5. 
68 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012).  
69 Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. II, § 2701, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) 
(2012)) (“[W]hoever (1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic 
communication service is provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility; and thereby 




Act;70 and (4) a common law right to privacy.71  
In March 2011, the court dismissed Maremont’s common law invasion of privacy claim, 
holding that the Illinois Right of Publicity Act replaced the common-law tort of appropriation of 
likeness.72 Maremont maintained that she had “sufficiently alleged two other common law 
invasion of privacy torts: (1) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another and (2) a 
claim based on publicity that reasonably places another in a false light before the public.”73 The 
court disagreed, holding that Maremont: 
fail[ed] to develop her argument that Defendants’ intrusion into her personal 
“digital life” is actionable under the common law theory of unreasonable intrusion 
upon the seclusion of another. Meanwhile, viewing the facts and all reasonable 
inferences in Maremont’s favor, she has failed to sufficiently allege a false light 
claim because she has not alleged that Defendants acted with actual malice, nor has 
she alleged special damages.74 
In December 2011, the court granted summary judgment to SFDG on the Illinois right of 
publicity claim as well as a renewed common-law right of privacy claim—intrusion upon 
seclusion.75 The court held that Maremont failed to meet the elements of the Right of Publicity 
Act—(1) an appropriation of one’s name or likeness; (2) without written consent; and (3) for 
another’s commercial benefit—because SFDG did not appropriate Maremont’s identity.76 SFDG 
announced Maremont’s absence and the fact that a guest blogger would be filling in for 
Maremont during her absence; thus, SFDG did not attempt to “pass themselves off as 
Maremont.”77 Furthermore, Maremont’s intrusion upon seclusion claim failed because 
Maremont could not “point to any private information upon which Defendants intruded.”78 
In March 2014, the court granted SFDG summary judgment on the Lanham Act claim.79 
Although the court recognized that “[w]hen viewed in the light most favorable to Maremont, a 
                                                 
obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage 
in such system [violates the SCA].”). The SCA authorizes civil suits for damages for victims of such unauthorized 
access. Id. § 2707. 
70 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1075/30(a) (2016) (“A person may not use an individual’s identity for commercial purposes 
during the individual’s lifetime without having obtained previous written consent from the appropriate person or 
persons . . . or their authorized representative.”). 
71 Maremont, 2014 WL 812401, at *1.  
72 Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., 772 F. Supp. 2d 967, 972 (N.D. Ill. 2011).  
73 Id. at 972. 
74 Id. at 973 (citation omitted). 
75 Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., No. 10 C 7811, 2011 WL 6101949, at *7–8 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2011). 
76 Id. at *7.     
77 Id.  
78 Id. at *8. To prove an intrusion upon seclusion claim, a plaintiff must show “(1) an unauthorized intrusion into 
seclusion; (2) the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; (3) the matter intruded upon was 
private; and (4) the intrusion caused the plaintiffs anguish and suffering.” Id. (quoting Cooney v. Chicago Pub. 
Schs., 407 Ill. App. 3d 358, 366 (2010)). 
79 Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., No. 10 C 7811, 2014 WL 812401, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2014).  
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jury could find . . . that Defendants committed a Lanham Act violation,”80 it also recognized that 
Maremont “submitted no proof of cognizable damages.”81 
The Stored Communications Act claim was allowed to proceed to trial, primarily because 
the court found that Maremont “need not prove actual damages in order to be entitled to statutory 
damages for an SCA violation.”82 The case—on the sole remaining claim of the SCA violation—
did go to trial, but that did not end favorably for Maremont either. In October 2014, a jury 
returned a verdict in favor of SFDG.83 Following the trial, the court awarded SFDG $4,401.14 in 
costs associated with defending the SCA claim.84 Maremont’s case is currently on appeal with 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.85 
Finally, Mattocks v. Black Entertainment Television86 involved a Facebook fan page 
Stacey Mattocks created in 2008 focusing on a television series called “The Game,” which aired 
on Black Entertainment Network (BET) and focused on the personal lives of professional 
football players.87 Mattocks’s fan page was not official, nor did it initially contain BET-
sponsored content.88 However, it amassed two million “likes” and, in 2010, caught the attention 
of executives at BET.89 In January 2011, BET hired Mattocks on a part-time basis to manage the 
show’s Facebook page.90 Upon Mattocks’s employment, BET began to supply her with exclusive 
and copyrighted content and to prominently display its trademarks on her Facebook page, which 
subsequently became official and whose likes grew to six million.91 One month later, the parties 
agreed to share administrative rights over the page, meaning that they could not prevent one 
another from posting content, making changes, or accessing the page or its audience.92  
Despite a seemingly fruitful union, the relationship severed. In June of the following 
year, as Mattocks and BET negotiated her possible full-time employment, Mattocks unilaterally 
restricted BET’s administrative access to the page and informed it that she would do so “[u]ntil 
                                                 
80 Id.  
81 Id. To recover under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff “must show that she ‘suffered actual injury, i.e., a loss of sales, 
profits, or present value (goodwill),’ or that Defendants were unjustly enriched.” Id. (citations omitted). At her 
deposition, Maremont denied suffering any financial injury, admitting that her damages claim was limited to mental 
distress. Later—after the close of discovery—Maremont claimed that she was entitled to a portion of SFDG’s gross 
sales for the period during which SFDG posted to her social media accounts. Id. Because the latter damages were 
never disclosed during discovery, the court struck Maremont’s evidence related to that claimed injury. Without a 
“basis from which to award Maremont any recovery if she succeeded in proving her Lanham Act claim,” the court 
granted SFDG summary judgment on the Lanham Act claim. Id. at *5. 
82 Id. at *7 (citations omitted). 
83 Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., No. 10 C 7811, 2015 WL 638503, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2015). 
84 Id. 
85 Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., No. 15-1548 (7th Cir. filed Mar. 13, 2015). 
86 43 F. Supp. 3d 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2014). 
87 Id. at 1314–15. 
88 Id. at 1315. 
89 Id. at 1316. 
90 Id. at 1315. 
91 Id. at 1316. 
92 Id. 




such time as we can reach an amicable and mutually beneficial resolution” concerning her 
employment.93 In reaction, BET created another official Facebook page for the series and asked 
Facebook to migrate the likes on the Mattocks-created page to its new page.94 Facebook granted 
BET’s request after its internal review determined that the new page was in fact the now-official 
representative of the brand owner.95 BET was also able to disable the Twitter account used by 
Mattocks to promote the show.96 
Mattocks sued BET for (1) tortious interference with contractual relationships she had 
with Facebook and Twitter; (2) breach of employment contract; (3) breach of duty of good faith 
and fair dealing; and (4) conversion of business interest.97 BET prevailed on all of the claims at 
the summary judgment stage. As to the tortious interference claim, Mattocks did not succeed 
because BET was not a stranger to the contract between Mattocks and Facebook.98 Because of 
the contract between Mattocks and BET and BET’s prior control over content posted on 
Mattocks’s page, BET had a financial interest in the contractual relationship between Mattocks 
and Facebook.99 BET was also awarded summary judgment on the breach of contract and breach 
of good faith and fair dealing claims because Mattocks had first breached the contract by 
restricting BET’s access to the Facebook page.100 
Finally, Mattocks’s conversion claim rested on whether an intangible “like” could be a 
verifiable business interest. Mattocks alleged that the “substantial interest” in the Facebook page 
and the “significant number of ‘Likes’” she generated provided her with business 
opportunities—opportunities BET willfully deprived her of by transferring the likes to a different 
page.101 The court, however, held that Mattocks could not establish that she owned a property 
interest in the Facebook likes.102 Furthermore, even if she could have established a property 
interest, she could not prove that BET’s migration request was unauthorized or wrongful.103 
Kravitz, Eagle, Maremont, and Mattocks created social media exposure for their 
employers through the use of their individual skills, contacts, and social media identities. Like 
many other employees today, they operated in an uncertain environment. On one hand, they were 
encouraged to promote their firms online (and indeed, for some, it was part of the job). On the 
other hand, the control over the fruits of their labor was left entirely undefined. None had 
contracts making explicit their rights (or lack thereof) in their social media accounts or 
                                                 
93 Id. (alteration in original). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 1317. 
96 Id. 
97 Id.  
98 Id. at 1319. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 1319–21. 
101 Id. at 1321. 
102 Id. (“[I]f anyone can be deemed to own the ‘likes’ on a Page, it is the individual users responsible for them. 
Given the tenuous relationship between “likes” on a Facebook Page and the creator of the Page, the ‘likes’ cannot be 
converted in the same manner as goodwill or other intangible business interests.”) (citation omitted). 
103 Id. 
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audiences. Yet, the four employees shared strong entitlements, which may or may not be 
acknowledged by current law.  
Although they sued on diverse and questionably applicable claims, these cases boil down 
to the employees’ entitlement over their digital self-ownership. The employees’ ire grew out of 
their need to: (1) continue to access the social media audiences they attracted, (2) control their 
own online identities, and (3) sever the association between their online personae and their 
former firms, so as to prevent the former employers from trading on their personal reputation and 
social media relationships. The outcomes of these contentious cases would impact not only the 
employees’ identities, but also their abilities to exercise their trades and communicate with their 
online cohorts.  
As Table 1 illustrates, the lawsuits focus on disparate legal claims, from personal 
property to privacy, tort to intellectual property—as if to test which would best apply. Indeed, 
litigants, courts, and commentators, clearly uncertain about applicable law, have conceptualized 
the reality and rights associated with a social media profile in a variety of different ways. Deeper 
analysis of these claims is necessary to understand how the law can and should provide a remedy 
to social media litigants. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
B. A Mixed Bag of Legal Claims 
Before analyzing the various claims in detail, it is helpful to parse the discrete aspects of social 
media to which litigants may feel entitled.104 A cursory analysis of the popular press and 
blogosphere reveals confusion about the legal rights a person has to his social media accounts.105 
Articles about the PhoneDog and Eagle cases often include the word “ownership” in the title,106 
or profess to cover the topic of ownership of online accounts.107 Some courts have also referred 
                                                 
104 See Mahlum & Pieper, supra note 11 (“[Answering the question of] who owns social media assets accessed or 
controlled by company employees [involves identifying the three different parts of a social media account:] the basic 
user information, . . . user-generated content[, and] . . . the relationships . . . which are the driving force behind social 
media sites.”).    
105 Rachael E. Ferrante, Comment, The Relationship Between Digital Assets and Their Transference at Death: “It’s 
Complicated,” 15 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 37, 42 (2013); see also Venkat Balasubramani, Employee’s Claims Against 
Employer for Unauthorized Use of Social Media Accounts Move Forward—Maremont v. SF Design Grp., TECH. & 
MKTG. L. BLOG (Dec. 8, 2011), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/12/maremont_v_sfg.htm (“Property-wise, 
it’s tough to slot the accounts in a particular box.”).   
106 See, e.g., Robert B. Milligan, Federal Court Questions Whether Damages Exist in LinkedIn Account Ownership 
Dispute, TRADING SECRETS (Mar. 2, 2013), http://www.tradesecretslaw.com/2013/03/articles/trade-secrets/federal-
court-questions-whether-damages-exist-in-linkedin-account-ownership-dispute/ (“The ownership of social media 
accounts in the employment context remains a very hot topic.”); Amy McIlwain, Social Media Ownership: Is it a 
Business Account or Personal Account, FIN. SOC. MEDIA (Oct. 10, 2013), http://financialsocialmedia.com/social-
media-ownership-business-account-personal-account/. 
107 See, e.g., Miao, supra note 12 (“Given the benefits and competitive necessity, for at least some businesses, to use 
social media, explicit ownership of an SMA [(social media account)] allows a business to control how and what it 
communicates to its customers and to the public.”); Jennifer L. Parent, Advising Clients on Today’s Top Employment 
Law Issues, in EMPLOYMENT LAW 2013: TOP LAWYERS ON TRENDS AND KEY STRATEGIES FOR THE UPCOMING YEAR 
50 (Aspatore Thought Leadership ed., 2013) (“A more difficult issue raised by these types of cases involves 
ownership over an employee’s individual LinkedIn accounts.”); Robert J. Kolansky, Note, Can We Really Ascribe a 
Dollar Amount to Interpersonal Communication? How PhoneDog v. Kravitz May Decide Who Owns a Twitter 




to “ownership” of social media accounts.108 Although they generally demonstrate society’s 
disorientation regarding who controls social media accounts, the slippery semantics are also 
misleading as to the law. The legal reality is that social media accounts are comprised of a 
bundle of rights, not all of which are legally recognized. 
On a basic level, an employee might claim rights to the content on the social media page, 
such as text, pictures, and logos. The right to posted content is beyond the scope of this inquiry 
because it is addressed by referring to established tenets of intellectual property law and the 
terms and conditions of the host websites. The harder questions—and the ones with which the 
law has struggled—involve the continued right to access and control the account and retain its 
amassed audience. Among other exercises, the right to control the account allows its holder to 
continue using the medium as a platform for speech and to make administrative and content 
changes (including limiting membership). Such was the dispute in Eagle and Maremont. The 
right to “keep” or “take” the account’s membership allows its holder to either migrate the 
audience to another social media account (unrelated to the employer or employee) or, more 
generally, retain the ability to continue contacting them.109 This was the nature of the dispute in 
PhoneDog110 and Mattocks.111 We will refer to the interests related to the rights to access and 
control the account, as well as the right to retain the audience, as “administrative rights.”112 After 
a brief discussion of claims regarding content posted to a social media site, we will turn to an 
analysis of administrative rights, considering the issue through the lens of the laws of (1) trade 
secret, (2) contract, (3) personal property, and (4) privacy.  
Intellectual property law governs any personal property interest in content posted on 
                                                 
Account, 20 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 133 (2013); Jeffrey Gross, Court Rules that LinkedIn Account Belongs 
to Employee, not Employer, NYTECHLITIGATION.COM (Mar. 15, 2013), http://nytechlitigation.com/court-rules-that-
linkedin-account-belongs-to-employee-not-employer/ (“Who owns a social media account, the employer or the 
employee, if there is no written corporate policy on point?”). 
108 PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011). The PhoneDog 
opinion found “that PhoneDog has adequately alleged that it owns . . . the Account.” Id. The Eagle court used 
similar language, implying that such ownership would entitle the user to the login information, all content posted on 
the profile, and all contacts associated with the account. Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2013 WL 943350, at *11 
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013) (“[T]he LinkedIn User Agreement clearly indicated that the individual user owned the 
account.”).   
109 Venkat Balasubramani, Battle Over LinkedIn Account Between Employer and Employee Largely Gutted—Eagle 
v. Morgan, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Oct. 7, 2012), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/10/court_dismisses_8.htm (“As with all of these disputes, control over the 
account itself should be separated from access to contact information or ongoing ability to contact customers, which 
is what the employer really cares about.”). 
110 See supra notes 20–30 and accompanying text. 
111 See supra notes 86–103 and accompanying text. 
112 Some have referred to social media profiles and online accounts as “digital assets,” distinct from the content they 
contain. The question of how digital assets should be characterized has been much discussed in the law, often with 
regard to the transference of digital assets upon death, divorce, or bankruptcy. The term “digital assets” has also 
been subject to varying definitions, which leaves the term vague. See Rachel Pinch, Note, Protecting Digital Assets 
After Death: Issues to Consider in Planning for Your Digital Estate, 60 WAYNE L. REV. 545, 547–48 (2014); 
Michael D. Roy, Note, Beyond the Digital Asset Dilemma: Will Online Services Revolutionize Estate Planning?, 24 
QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 376, 384 (2011); Kristina Sherry, Comment, What Happens to Our Facebook Accounts 
When We Die?: Probate Versus Policy and the Fate of Social-Media Assets Postmortem, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 185, 
193–94 (2012).  
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social media profiles.113 Social media content is the subject of a copyright or trademark, 
especially in a business context. Social media posts, photos, and videos are protected by 
copyright. Trademark law protects a company name and logo. Aside from content that is 
protected by a company’s trademarks or copyrights, users are the sole owners of the content 
posted on their social media profiles. All three major social networking sites—Facebook, 
LinkedIn and Twitter—give users ownership over the content of their profiles.114 In other words, 
while the social media sites maintain ownership of the actual accounts,115 they stake no claim to 
user-generated content—the user retains the intellectual property rights to his creations.  
  The sites’ terms of service governing user rights are written for individuals, not 
necessarily businesses who employ individuals to speak for them.116 In the absence of a contract 
or policy outlining the post-employment retention of intellectual property rights to content posted 
on social media, employers and former employees will be forced to duke it out on traditional 
copyright theories of work-made-for-hire and joint authorship. If the posts were made in the 
employee’s scope of employment,117 copyright law’s work-made-for-hire doctrine would apply 
and the employer will hold all rights to the work.118 If the employee did not author the posts as 
part of his job, the content on the company profile might be considered a work of joint 
authorship. Under this theory, both parties are coauthors and co-owners and have the ability to 
restrict changes to the work, the use of their name, and claim to authorship.119 These legal 
theories are well established; their applicability in any given case relies heavily on the 
                                                 
113 See Bethany N. Whitfield, Comment, Social Media @ Work: #PolicyNeeded, 66 ARK. L. REV. 843, 868 (2013) 
(“Determination of ownership rights in the content posted by an employee, however, is an entirely different matter. 
One may determine ownership of social-media content by evaluating several factors, including the circumstances 
that imply ownership, an ownership agreement regarding social-media posts, and content entitled to copyright 
protection. Therefore, employers should proactively define their social-media rights.”) (emphasis in original) 
(footnotes omitted). 
114 See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 61, at § 2; User Agreement, § 2, LINKEDIN, 
https://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement?trk=hb_ft_userag (last updated Oct. 23, 2014); Twitter Terms of 
Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/tos (last updated Jan. 27, 2016). 
115 User Agreement, supra note 114, § 3.1; Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 114, § 4; Jason Mazzone, 
Facebook’s Afterlife, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1643, 1648–49 (2012) (“Facebook’s terms of use (called ‘Statement of Rights 
and Responsibilities’), to which every user must agree in accessing the Facebook site, do not specifically state that 
Facebook retains ownership of individual Facebook accounts. Nonetheless, several key provisions make clear that, 
according to Facebook, accounts are not property owned by individual users. For one thing, Facebook imposes 
numerous restrictions on how a Facebook account can be used. Users who violate the ‘letter or spirit’ of Facebook’s 
terms lose access to the site. Thus, what Facebook users possess is the ability to access the Facebook site via an 
account so long as they comply with Facebook’s terms.”) (footnotes omitted). 
116 Many businesses are wary of social media as a conduit for the infringement or dilution of intellectual property, or 
dissemination of trade secrets or disparaging information. See Abril et al., supra note 7, at 90 (noting that on social 
media, “[a] disgruntled employee can easily divulge trade secrets, intellectual property, or confidential 
information—or can harm the organization’s reputation with disparaging commentary. Even a well-intentioned but 
reckless employee can tarnish an organization by disseminating potential evidence of the organization’s negligence, 
immorality, or incompetence.”). 
117 Ardis Health, LLC v. Nankivell, No. 11 Civ. 5013(NRB), 2011 WL 4965172, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2011) 
(finding employee’s duties included maintaining social media accounts). 
118 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
119 Id. § 106A(a) (2012). 




circumstances of each case. 
Intellectual property law addresses only the issue of who retains rights to the content 
posted on a social media account. It does not directly address the issue at the core of the cases 
discussed in this article—the right to access and control of the account itself and its associated 
audience. Plaintiffs typically allege a host of varied and often-unsuccessful claims, including 
violations of trade secret (regarding the account’s password), privacy, and contract law. Some 
have also alleged conversion and other property-related claims. These different claims through 
which litigants have presented rights in a social media profile and its related audience have merit, 
although a closer look reveals their limitations. We address the merits and drawbacks of trade 
secret, contract, personal property, and privacy, in turn. 
1. Trade Secret 
Some plaintiffs have claimed that social media passwords are trade secrets and their continued 
unauthorized use constitutes misappropriation.120 Other litigants have gone further, claiming that 
the list of social media friends or followers was, itself, a trade secret.121 Can a password or a 
social media audience be a trade secret?  
  A determination of whether information, be it a username and password or a social media 
audience, rises to the level of a trade secret is a highly fact-specific inquiry that will depend upon 
an analysis of several factors.  
First, it must not be generally known or readily ascertainable to those who might 
obtain economic value from its use. In other words, it must be secret, at least with 
regard to potential competitors. Second, the information must derive independent 
economic value from being secret. Third, the information must be subject to 
reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy.122   
One scholar has argued that account access information (specifically a username and 
password) meets the three requirements to be a trade secret. Professor Argento argues: 
The secret of access to the social network account—the password—should be 
protectable as a trade secret. A password’s secrecy confers independent economic 
value by giving the account holder exclusive access to the links in the account. This 
trade secret protection, however, would be highly limited. It would protect only 
access to the account, but not any content otherwise available to the public. 
Crucially, any other user could still contact the account’s followers through other 
accounts. Although narrow, trade secret protection would protect the interest at the 
                                                 
120 See PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011). 
121 See Christou v. Beatport, LLC, 849 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1062 (D. Colo. 2012). Christou involves a long battle 
between a nightclub owner and a former employee-turned-competitor regarding once jointly-controlled MySpace 
profiles. Id. The plaintiffs claimed that the list of friends associated with those profiles were trade secrets akin to a 
customer list. Id. at 1074. The court concluded that the plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to maintain their trade secret 
claim at the motion to dismiss stage. Id. at 1076. The plaintiffs subsequently withdrew their trade secret claim during 
trial. See Christou v. Beatport, LLC, No. 10–cv–02912–RBJ–KMT, 2014 WL 1293296 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2014). 
122 Argento, supra note 11, at 249 (footnotes omitted); see also, Jasmine McNealy, Who Owns Your Friends?: 
PhoneDog v. Kravitz and Business Claims of Trade Secret in Social Media Information, 39 RUTGERS COMPUTER & 
TECH L.J. 30, 36–37 (2013). 
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heart of these disputes: the right to retain exclusive access to the account’s 
followers.123 
  Argento’s analysis, although compelling, falls short. A username and password that grant 
access to a profile simply do not have independent economic value and thus cannot be a trade 
secret. Access information can be analogized to keys to a safe deposit box. The value of the keys, 
like a username and password, is arguably temporary because they are only the means with 
which to retrieve the property or information contained inside. Without content to be accessed, 
the keys have no value. Once those assets are accessed, the keys are inconsequential. Their value 
is not independent, but in fact is dependent upon the desirability or value of the contents they 
unlock. Indeed, just as physical keys and locks can be changed, passwords can also be easily 
altered, rendering the prior version valueless.124 Further, relying on the flimsy trade secrecy of 
passwords leaves the social media audience unprotected. As we have contended, the interest at 
the heart of these disputes centers on administrative rights—the continued ability to interact with 
an audience, not the one-time access to the profile. 
   Application of trade secret law to social media audiences is similarly problematic. Can 
social media relationships or contacts ever be trade secrets? Such a claim has arisen in at least 
two recent cases, with little resolution. In CDM Media USA, Inc. v. Simms,125 a marketing 
company claimed that a former employee misappropriated a trade secret when he continued to 
use the LinkedIn group that he created during his employment. Although the court denied a 
motion to dismiss, it suggested that whether the list of its 679 members constituted a trade secret 
would depend on information regarding the contents, configuration, and function of the LinkedIn 
group.126 A second case, Christou v. Beatport, LLC, involves a long battle between nightclub 
owners and a former employee-turned-competitor regarding the right to access a MySpace 
profile and control the contacts associated with the account.127 The former employer claimed that 
the lists of friends associated with its social media profiles were trade secrets.128 The defendants 
argued that such contacts could not possibly constitute trade secrets because they were available 
to the public and not secret.129 The Christou court, ruling on a motion to dismiss, found that the 
question of whether a social media contact list was a trade secret is a question of fact, and that 
the plaintiffs had alleged enough facts to withstand a motion to dismiss.130 Given that both of 
these cases concluded at the preliminary motion to dismiss stage, they provide little guidance. 
                                                 
123 Argento, supra note 11, at 205 (footnotes omitted). 
124 See Miao, supra note 12, at 1048–49. But see Kyle-Beth Hilfer, Minimizing Legal Risks for Clients Using Social 
Media to Advertise and Market Their Brands, 38 WESTCHESTER B.J. 35, 42 (2012), http://wcbany.site-
ym.com/resource/resmgr/Journals/2012_ws_hilfer.pdf (arguing that employers should “file trademarks for 
[employees’ social media] handles, and they should control the administration and passwords for the accounts to 
strengthen their claims of ownership”). 
125 No. 14 CV 9111, 2015 WL 1399050 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2015). 
126 Id. at *4. 
127 Christou v. Beatport, LLC, 849 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1074–75 (D. Colo. 2012).  
128 Id. at 1074. 
129 Id. at 1074–75.     
130 Id. at 1076. In a March 31, 2014 Order, the judge ruled that the trade secret claims, withdrawn by the plaintiffs 
during trial, were not made in bad faith as there was evidence the Myspace password was taken, but the Order does 
not elaborate on whether it is a trade secret. See Christou v. Beatport, LLC, No. 10–cv–02912–RBJ–KMT, 2014 WL 




Many scholars and courts have viewed a social media audience as simply a subscriber or 
customer list.131 Under this perspective, determining rights to a social media audience through a 
trade secret analysis makes sense, since trade secret law is the traditional method of protection 
for a customer list. However, as will be explained in Part II, this characterization of a social 
media audience will often be overly simplistic and outdated. It breaks down when applied to the 
reality of a social media audience, which is fluid and dynamic rather than a static list of 
names.132   
The Christou court hinted at recognition of the richness of a social media audience. The 
judge wrote: 
Social networking sites enable companies. . . to acquire hundreds and even 
thousands of “friends.” These “friends” are more than simple lists of names of 
potential customers. “Friending” a business or individual grants that business or 
individual access to some of one’s personal information, information about his or 
her interests and preferences, and perhaps most importantly for a business, contact 
information and a built-in means of contact.133  
Although an encouraging step, this limited view continues to miss the broader 
perspective. The likes and dislikes frequently found on a social media profile have more 
significance than simply providing information about those contacts; instead they often become 
part of the user’s profile, much of which is visible to the broader audience.134 While in some 
circumstances a contact list may indeed meet the criteria required to establish a trade secret, a 
social media audience encompasses far more than a simple list of contacts. The focus on trade 
secrets misses the essential point about the value of a social media audience, which is found not 
by focusing on each individual contact, and placing a monetary value on that particular 
relationship. Instead, the value lies in the audience as a whole and the impact it has on the user’s 
online persona.135 
                                                 
1293296, at *28 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2014). 
131 See, e.g., Miao, supra note 12, at 1019 (referring to a social media audience as a “subscriber list”); Adam S. 
Walker, PhoneDog vs. Kravitz: In the World of Social Media, Who Really Owns What?, 50 PRACTICAL LAW. 49, 49 
(June 2012) (referring to a social media audience as “followers”); PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 
WL 5415612, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011) (referring to Twitter audience as “subscribers” or “followers”).  
132 See infra Part II.D. 
133 Christou, 849 F. Supp. 2d at 1075. 
134 Indeed, a visible list of contacts negates the possibility of a trade secret. See McLaughlin, supra note 10, at 106 
(“Finding that these user accounts are eligible for trade-secret protection seems entirely antithetical to social media’s 
purpose in the workplace. Simply stated, professional networking requires public exposure.”); McNealy, supra note 
122, at 50 (“The purpose of social media is to share and consume information. Connections are public, and meant to 
be so. A business using an SNS [(social network site)] platform to generate customers does not change the fact that 
anyone with an Internet connection can view the business’s list of friends or followers.”) (footnotes omitted). 
135 Miao suggests that a list of contacts associated with an online social media account may not rise to the level of a 
trade secret because the subscribers themselves choose to remain on the list. See Miao, supra note 12, at 1050; see 
also Walker, supra note 131. While interesting, the changing nature of a contact list audience does not necessarily 
mean it is incapable of ownership. Other lists that may be a trade secret can easily be unsubscribed to, yet that does 
not negate the possibility of ownership. 
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2. Contract 
Contract law provides two possible avenues of analysis. First, the Terms of Service agreement 
(ToS) between the employee who created the profile and the social media site might provide a 
basis for an interference with contract claim, as was the case in Eagle.136 Second, employment 
agreements may dictate the disposition of administrative rights when the employment 
relationship ends. However, such agreements may be an unlawful restraint of trade, as we 
explain in more detail at the end of this subpart.137 
Terms of Service agreements govern the relationship between a social media site and its 
users. In creating social media accounts, users enter into these agreements individually with the 
website. They typically govern how the account can be used, who can use and access the 
account, and what content can be posted.138 For example, Facebook and LinkedIn require users 
to have personal profiles before creating pages for businesses. The individual user/creator, not 
the business he represents, is held responsible under the site’s terms of service.139  
  When a former employer revokes access to the social media audience cultivated by the 
employee, some former employees have sued for tortious interference with contractual relations, 
a common law tort arising out of a third party’s intentional interference with a contract 
expectancy that leads to damages.140 Under this theory, the employers acted intentionally to 
induce a breach of the terms and conditions—and their ensuing rights—vis-à-vis the social 
media websites. Employees, however, have thus far not been successful in asserting this tort in 
this context. Both Eagle and Mattocks suggest that agents are likely to have a hard time proving 
the elements of the tort. In addition to the courts’ reluctance to find in favor of employees 
regarding their ToS arguments, their application as a method of resolving disputes fails to 
acknowledge the interests involved. ToS agreements are written generically to apply to any user 
who creates the account. Social media sites will rarely become involved in disputes over access 
to a profile, siding in almost all circumstances with the individual who created the profile, 
without regard to whether that might violate a separate employment contract, unless trademark or 
copyright violation allegations are involved, as they were in Mattocks. Thus, the application of 
ToS, alone, may result in an outcome that is entirely unfair to employers. Furthermore, whether 
contract law is, or should be, applicable to determine who is entitled to administrative rights is 
certainly questionable.141 As a result, possible employment contracts are likely the better avenue. 
However, they too have their limitations. 
Clearly, many of the cases discussed herein could have been easily avoided with a clear 
                                                 
136 See supra notes 43, 51–52 and accompanying text. 
137 See infra notes 142–147 and accompanying text. 
138 See User Agreement, supra note 114; Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 114; Statement of Rights and 
Responsibilities, supra note 61.   
139 See Page Basics, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/281592001947683/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2016); 
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 61.  
140 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
141 See, e.g., David Horton, Indescendibility, 102 CAL. L. REV. 548, 597 (2014) (“The degree to which courts should 
honor adhesive terms is one of the most fraught issues in modern contract law. The problem is the yawning gulf 
between contract theory and contract reality: although binding agreements supposedly arise from mutual assent, we 
are only dimly aware of the fine print spawned by most commercial transactions. Thus, once in a great while, a 
judge will find that a purported form contract is not a contract at all.”) (footnotes omitted).   




employment contract designating the rights to the social media profile. The continued stream of 
cases on this matter evidence, at least casually, that such contract provisions are not widely used 
in practice, despite the fact that many commentators have recommended their use.142 However, 
those contracts that limit ex-employee access to social media may be unenforceable as an 
overbroad restraint of trade. 
Recent cases challenging the validity of noncompete and non-solicitation agreements vis-
à-vis social media suggest that courts tend to take an employee-friendly view. Some courts have 
held that ex-employee posts announcing new employment or inviting social media audiences to 
view a new employer’s website do not violate non-solicitation agreements.143 At least one court 
has held that connecting with former clients on Facebook is permissible.144 Even posting a job 
opportunity that would likely reach employees that an individual was contractually prohibited 
from soliciting does not violate non-solicitation agreements if the post is publicly available.145 
One court has even posited that agreements restricting employees from engaging in the above 
social media interactions would likely be overly broad and unenforceable.146 McLaughlin argues 
that a non-compete agreement requiring an employee to transfer rights to a social media account 
when employment ends (a “forced-transfer” provision) may be fundamentally unfair because it 
forces an employee into a situation that necessarily requires a breach of contract— either the ToS 
or the employment contract.147 “[W]hen employers knowingly induce employees to breach SNS 
user agreements, courts should acknowledge the unequal bargaining power between the parties, 
and thus equitably prohibit the enforcement of these agreements.”148  
Thus, contract law, while it might be applicable and useful in select cases in which the 
parties have signed an employment agreement that identifies rights to social media accounts, will 
often not provide courts with useful tools to resolve these disputes. 
3. Personal Property 
As mentioned above, the relationship between a social media site and its user is governed by the 
site’s ToS agreement, which specifically covers whatever property interests may arise through 
creation of a social media account. One cannot own a social media account in the traditional 
sense of personal property law. As discussed previously, a look at the ToS agreements of three 
                                                 
142 See Argento, supra note 11, at 226 (“In many cases, parties could avoid disputes by expressly agreeing about 
which party has the right to control the social network account. Nevertheless, the default rules remain important 
because some parties will inevitably fail to contract around them. Many companies have no employment agreements 
for their employees at all, and those that do may fail to address rights to social network accounts. Employment 
agreements are particularly prone to omitting important issues because employees’ roles tend to change over time.”) 
(footnotes omitted); Hope A. Cominsky & Tracey E. Diamond, The Risks and Rewards of a BYOD Program: 
Ensuring Corporate Compliance Without Causing “Bring Your Own Disaster” at Work, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 
385, 401 (2014). None of the employers in PhoneDog, Eagle, or Maremont had social media policies in place.  
143 See BTS, USA, Inc. v. Exec. Perspectives, LLC, No. X10CV116010685, 2014 WL 6804545, at *12 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Oct. 16, 2014); Pre-Paid Legal Servs., Inc. v. Cahill, 924 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1292 (D. Okla. 2013).  
144 Invidia, LLC v. Difonzo, No. MICV20123798H, 2012 WL 5576406, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 2012). 
145 BTS, 2014 WL 6804545, at *12. 
146 Id.  
147 McLaughlin, supra note 10, at 114–15.  
148 Id. at 114. 
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major social networking platforms—Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn—reveals that none grant 
users any type of ownership interest in their accounts.149 Terms of service typically grant 
members nothing more than a revocable license to use the site.150 Users do not have rights to 
convey, transfer, sell, or use their social media profiles in the same way that traditional property 
ownership would imply.    
However, in some respects business social media accounts do indeed provide value to the 
business with access to customers and potential customers. For instance, as mentioned above, 
bankruptcy courts have found that business accounts on social media, including pages for 
businesses run by individual employees, are property interests cognizable as intangible assets 
under the Bankruptcy Code.151 In In re CTLI, LLC, the bankruptcy court was faced with the 
challenge of determining whether a Facebook page was primarily a business or personal asset.152 
Alcede, the debtor, contended that the page in question (“Tactical Firearms”) was distinguished 
from his personal profile and another page he created called “Jeremy Alcede Patriot.”153 Like 
Kravitz, Eagle, and Maremont, Alcede argued that the page’s followers reflected the relationship 
with an audience he had developed, thus earning him a stake in the page based on the goodwill 
that had accrued to the account.154 
Even though Alcede wrote posts in the first person and changed the name of the page, the 
court found that its primary use as a forum to promote the business was persuasive evidence the 
page was a business page.155 However, the court made an important distinction, attempting to 
disentangle professional goodwill from business goodwill. Recognizing that business goodwill is 
developed by employees of the business over time, the court stated that professional goodwill 
was that amount of goodwill that is withdrawn when the individual leaves the business; whatever 
remains is business goodwill, an intangible asset that rightfully accrues to the business and 
remains with it when the employee leaves.156 Employees are entitled only to professional 
goodwill, which the court identified as embodied in the ability of Facebook followers of the 
                                                 
149 See User Agreement, supra note 114; Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 114; Mazzone, supra note 115, at 
1648–49.    
150 See Jamie Patrick Hopkins & Ilya Alexander Lipin, Viable Solutions to the Digital Estate Planning Dilemma, 99 
IOWA L. REV. BULL. 61, 66–67 (2014); Sally Brown Richardson, How Community Property Jurisdictions Can Avoid 
Being Lost in Cyberspace, 72 LA. L. REV. 89, 111 (2011) (“Twitter accounts, though creating property rights, are not 
owned. The tweeter-wife who creates the Twitter account during the marriage has a license to use the account; 
Twitter remains the owner of the actual Twitter service.”); John Conner, Comment, Digital Life After Death: The 
Issue of Planning for a Person’s Digital Assets After Death, 3 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 301, 306–07 
(2011); Whitfield, supra note 113, at 868 (“From an intellectual property and a contractual perspective, actual user 
accounts offered by social-network sites appear to be the exclusive property of the sites, rather than the property of 
employee or employer users.”).   
151 See In re CTLI, LLC, 528 B.R. 359, 359 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015); In re Borders Grp., No. 11-10614 (MG), 2011 
WL 5520261, at *13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2011). 
152 In re CTLI, 528 B.R. at 361. 
153 Id. at 369.  
154 Id. at 373. 
155 Id. at 369–70. 
156 Id. at 373. 




Tactical Firearms page to follow Alcede to his personal Jeremy Alcede Patriot page.157  
On the other hand, in Eagle, the plaintiff sought the right to control her social media 
profile by suing for identity theft and conversion. The court expressed discomfort in applying 
property-related theories to social media and denied her claim for identity theft, finding that her 
name was publicly available and therefore not unlawfully possessed.158 The Eagle court also 
denied the claim of conversion, noting that intangible property, such as software, domain names 
and “an intangible right to access a specific page on a computer” cannot be subject to a 
conversion claim.159 Although some commentators have advocated for intangible items such as 
digital assets to be considered personal property,160 current case law does not suggest any 
movement in that direction.161 
4. Privacy 
A sudden disconnection from one’s group or an unwanted association (or disassociation) with a 
former employer can provoke feelings of intrusion, embarrassment, and anxiety. Such actions 
may also have economic and professional repercussions. For these reasons, former employees 
often allege violation of privacy in attempting to regain control over their social media and 
digital selves. However, courts have floundered in their approaches to privacy online, resulting in 
disparate results. For instance, the plaintiff in Eagle prevailed on her privacy cause of action yet 
the court did not award her damages.162 The Maremont court held that the plaintiff had provided 
no evidence to support her claim that the defendant employer had intruded upon her seclusion by 
accessing her social media accounts without consent.163 
Generally, nothing is private on social media. The Supreme Court “consistently has held 
that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to 
third parties.”164 Since sharing and interaction are the premises of social media, proving privacy 
                                                 
157 Id. at 373–74. 
158 Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2013 WL 943350, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013). 
159 Id. at *10. 
160 Argento, supra note 11, at 274 (“In general, the law appears to be moving in the direction of finding intangible 
items such as domain names and phone numbers to be personal property and subject to conversion[;]” noting some 
cases that have found domain names and phone numbers to be personal property). See also Horton, supra note 141, 
at 568; Susan Eisenberg, Note, Intangible Takings, 60 VAND. L. REV. 667, 696 (2007) (arguing in favor of 
recognition of a “new class of virtual property” which would include web sites, screen names, email addresses, etc.). 
161 See, e.g., Eagle, 2013 WL 943350, at *10; Giordano v. Claudio, 714 F. Supp. 2d 508, 524 (E.D. Pa. 2010); 
Apparel Bus. Sys., LLC v. Tom James Co., No. 06–1092, 2008 WL 858754, at *18–19 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 
2008) (“Software is not the kind of property subject to a conversion claim. . . .”); DirecTV, Inc. v. Frick, No. Civ.A. 
03-6045, 2004 WL 438663, at *2–3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2004) (finding that satellite signals constitute intangible 
property which cannot be converted under Pennsylvania law); Famology.com Inc. v. Perot Sys. Corp., 158 F. Supp. 
2d 589, 591 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that domain names are not the type of tangible property that may be 
converted). 
162 Eagle, 2013 WL 943350, at *15.  
163 Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., No. 10 C 7811, 2014 WL 812401 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2014). 
164 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (citations omitted); cf. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 
758–65 (2010) (discussing the complicated privacy expectations relating to communications made on electronic 
equipment owned by a government employer and what intrusions can be regarded as “reasonable” as such 
technology becomes more integrated into the workplace). But see United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) 
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in this realm is difficult, if not impossible, under current interpretations of law.165 Sharing photos 
even on the most restrictive of privacy settings does not guarantee privacy, no matter what 
personal entitlement the person may hold. In United States v. Meregildo,166 the defendant only 
allowed his profile to be viewed by his friends, not an extended network of friends of friends, or 
publicly. Despite these settings, the court held that Meregildo had no justifiable expectation that 
his Facebook friends would keep his profile private and dissemination of information on his 
profile by his friends was legal.167 Even a minor does not have an expectation of privacy on 
social media.168 When seventeen-year-old Chelsea Chaney’s bikini-clad Facebook photo was 
used in a school presentation about Internet safety, the court found she had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy when she shared the photo with the broadest possible audience on her 
profile.169  
As the vast majority of relevant cases make clear, a social media audience, and its close 
connection with the user’s profile, will not likely be deemed private.170 Moreover, even if the 
right to privacy has been violated, plaintiffs may still have difficulty proving damage.171  
The sheer variety of claims and the courts’ hesitant approaches to resolving them may be 
evidence of a lack of understanding of the nature and exercise that these employees performed 
on social media. Thus, before determining how the law should address post-employment social 
medial audience retention, a critical examination of the act of social media audience management 
is required. The following part examines social media, with an eye toward unraveling the nature 
of the plaintiffs’ purported harms, and ultimately, lending support to the application of a new 
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165 See, e.g., Chaney v. Fayette Cty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1315–18 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (finding no 
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168 See Chaney, 977 F. Supp. 2d at 1316. 
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Monitoring, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 285, 289–90 (2011); Allyson W. Haynes, Virtual Blinds: Finding Online Privacy in 
Offline Precedents, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 603, 638 (2012); Pauline T. Kim, Electronic Privacy and 
Employee Speech, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 901, 902 (2012); Susan Park, Employee Internet Privacy: A Proposed Act 
that Balances Legitimate Employer Rights and Employee Privacy, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 779, 799–800 (2014); Robert 
Sprague, Orwell Was an Optimist: The Evolution of Privacy in the United States and Its De-Evolution for American 
Employees, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 83, 84 (2008). 
171 See supra text accompanying notes 53–54, 78; McLaughlin, supra note 10, at 104 (“Although some privacy 
rights recognize the inherent value in an individual’s name and reputation, imposing such a high threshold for 
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violation.”). 





II. CONCEPTUALIZING THE VALUE AND EXERCISE OF SOCIAL MEDIA  
One reason the law is so muddled is because courts and lawmakers battle with conceptualizations 
of the nature and value of a social media presence.172 Is a social media audience like an old-
fashioned Rolodex or database listing a series of contacts? Or is it more like a corporate business 
card? Could it ever be as labor-intensive as an advertising campaign or as private as a secret recipe? 
Evidence of the struggle in understanding social media abounds in the four representative cases 
above: PhoneDog wondered whether a password could be a trade secret; the Eagle court pondered 
whether a company could keep a former employee’s LinkedIn account; the judge in Maremont 
had to decide whether it was reasonable for an employer to continue marketing via an absent 
employee’s Facebook account; and in Mattocks, the court had to determine whether a “like” was 
a verifiable business interest. These are ultimately normative questions whose answers rest not 
only in interpretations of applicable law, but in accurate characterizations of a digital environment 
that did not exist a decade ago.   
   What follows are five tenets that describe the process, the reality, and ultimately the 
value, of social media audience management. While individuals engage in social media for 
varied purposes, we focus narrowly on the case where employees promote their employers 
through social media. For ease of reference, we refer to the employee directing and managing the 
social media site as the “manager.” It is the common act of online socialization, and its resultant 
relationships, that form the essence of this analysis. 
A. Through Its Rules and Architecture, Each Website Provides Context, Norms, and  
Culture for Social Media Interaction 
Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn—all founded between 2002 and 2006173—are the dominant 
social media platforms in the United States.174 The terms and conditions of the three sites are 
similar. None grants users any ownership interest in the accounts themselves.175 Users of all 
                                                 
172 See McLaughlin, supra note 10, at 100 (“The [Eagle] court’s comparison of social media to dissimilar 
technologies shows the inherent challenges associated with the application of archaic doctrines to novel 
innovation.”). 
173 See Phillips, supra note 3; Arthur, supra note 3; A Brief History of LinkedIn, supra note 3. 
174 Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn are three of the five most popular social media sites according to a survey by 
the Pew Research Center. Maeve Duggan et al., Social Media Update 2014, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 9, 2015), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/01/09/social-media-update-2014/. Facebook is the most widely used with seventy-
one percent of internet users over eighteen signed up as members. Id. The other two platforms—Pinterest and 
Instagram—differ from the aforementioned sites in that the two are photo-sharing sites where the only dialogue 
between users occurs in comments of photos users upload. Id. 
175 LinkedIn and Twitter provide the most explicit statements negating any possibility of ownership. Section 2.4 of 
the LinkedIn User Agreement, titled “Your Membership,” states that “[t]he profile you create on LinkedIn . . . will 
become part of LinkedIn and except for the content and information that you license to us is owned by LinkedIn. 
However, between you and others, your account belongs to you.” User Agreement, supra note 114 (emphasis 
added). See also Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 114; Mazzone, supra note 115, at 1648 (“Facebook’s terms of 
use (called ‘Statement of Rights and Responsibilities’”), to which every user must agree in accessing the Facebook 
site, do not specifically state that Facebook retains ownership of individual Facebook accounts. Nonetheless, several 
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three sites are the sole owners of the content posted on their profiles.176  
   Facebook is an “online social network where members develop personalized web profiles 
to interact and share information with other members.”177 Individuals can create both personal 
profiles and pages about themselves or others.178 Profiles and pages can include multimedia, 
news articles, and personal updates.179 Facebook users generally have control over their visibility 
settings and can set their profiles to be public or visible only to the user’s “friends.”180 Users see 
their friends’ activity in their “News Feed” on the Facebook home page.181 “Likes” are “a way 
for Facebook users to share information with each other” and convey enjoyment or approval 
without leaving a textual comment.182 When users “like” content posted on a profile or page, 
they become connected with it.183 Once connected, users will see content from that profile or 
page in their news feed, the page will appear on their profile, and the user will appear on the 
page as someone who likes that page, as an association or implicit endorsement.184  
   In contrast to Facebook’s emphasis on the personal, LinkedIn distinguishes itself as a site 
for individuals to network in a professional capacity. Individuals with whom a user is “linked” 
see updates to the individual’s profile (depending on the individual’s notification settings).185 In 
keeping with its business-networking culture, LinkedIn profiles have sections for education, 
associations, honors and awards.186 LinkedIn users may only maintain one account at a time and 
may set up company pages only as authorized representatives.187 
                                                 
key provisions make clear that, according to Facebook, accounts are not property owned by individual users. For 
one thing, Facebook imposes numerous restrictions on how a Facebook account can be used. Users who violate the 
‘letter or spirit’ of Facebook’s terms lose access to the site. Thus, what Facebook users possess is the ability to 
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176 User Agreement, supra note 114, § 3.1; Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 114, § 4; Statement of Rights and 
Responsibilities, supra note 61, § 2. 
177 Mattocks v. Black Entm’t Television, LLC, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1311, 1314 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (citations omitted). 
178 Pages must be created and managed by people who have personal profiles. Page Basics, supra note 139. 
Facebook pages can either be created by authorized representatives of a company or by individuals as “Fan” pages, 
which can be either unofficial or officially sponsored. Mattocks, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 1315. 
179 Mattocks, 43 F. Supp. 3d. at 1314. 
180 Id. at 1314–15.  
181 How News Feed Works, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/327131014036297/ (last visited Mar. 15, 
2016). 
182 Mattocks, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 1315 (citation omitted). See also What Does it Mean to “Like” Something?, 
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/110920455663362 (last visited Mar. 15, 2016). 
183 Mattocks, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 1315 (citations omitted). 
184 Id. Users are in control of their “likes” and may remove them at any time. Id.  
185 See BTS, USA, Inc. v. Exec. Perspectives, LLC, No.X10CV116010685, 2014 WL 6804545, at *3 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. Oct. 16, 2014). 
186 See Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11-4303, 2013 WL 943350, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013). 
187 See id. LinkedIn requires that users who make company profiles have a full profile for over a week, have several 
connections on the profile, and have the company for which the page is being created as the current employment 
listed on the user’s profile. LinkedIn also requires a company email domain and asks users to confirm via a check 
box that they are authorized to create the page by the company. See Requirements for Adding Company Pages, 
LINKEDIN (Jan. 30, 2015), https://help.linkedin.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/1594/ft/eng. 




 Twitter differs greatly from Facebook and LinkedIn because it is not a profile-based 
network. Its default setting allows users to freely follow each other without prior notice or 
approval. Users can see the “tweets,” 140 character messages that can include a photo or video, of 
all the accounts they follow.188 Users can also mention each other in tweets using “@” and the 
username of another189 and hashtags (“#”) to tag topics.190 Individuals can create accounts with 
any username they desire that is not already in use,191 but the site offers a verification option to 
“establish authenticity of identities of key individuals and brands on Twitter.”192 
B. The Social Media Manager Is Spokesperson, Author, and Relationship Administrator 
In most instances, a business’s primary goal in maintaining an online social media presence is to 
communicate and build relationships with a large assembly of consumers and constituents, 
thereby strengthening brand reputation and recognition. The employee charged with maintaining 
the profile (Twitter feed or Facebook page) may be acting in the capacity of a representative of 
the employer. Unlike a traditional spokesperson reading from a well-vetted script, the employee 
must infuse personality into the social media so as to anthropomorphize the company, 
communicating in a way that creates and sustains relationships.193  
   In the world of social media, where many compete for attention, it is well recognized that 
“accounts don’t really work unless they have a touch of personality. Tweeted press releases 
aren’t interesting on Twitter; personal wit is regarded above all, and encouraged at every smart 
firm with a social media presence.”194 As such, to be successful, the social media manager must 
entertain as well as inform, add value as well as perform. Unlike the traditional author, his 
written work is published and judged instantaneously; his agility with words, prized. He must 
also be responsive, reactive, and up-to-date. Ultimately, the objective is to create a relationship 
with the audience through the persona presented. 
   Given these varied roles, the process is time-consuming and requires a great deal of 
effort. One business blogger compared the demands of social media on a business to a hungry 
baby requiring feeding on a very regular basis.195 Audience management requires understanding 
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189 See What are Replies and Mentions?, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/14023 (last visited Mar. 15, 
2016). 
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the audience, planning content, and “constant, ubiquitous engagement.”196 Managers must 
remember identities and connections of individuals in the network and what information has 
been exchanged, and when.197 Some companies have been forced to dedicate full-time 
employees solely to manage social media.198 According to one study, many business owners and 
senior executives spend over four hours per day on social media.199 Because of the time, labor, 
and personality put in to this effort, one scholar called losing a profile a “harsh blow.”200 
D.C. The Social Media Audience Is Interactive and Highly Dynamic 
Social media scholars Alice Marwick and danah boyd have proposed that the medium has 
changed the relationship between the audience and the broadcaster.201 The traditional broadcast 
audience, comprised of a single broadcaster communicating with nonresponsive observers, has 
evolved into a highly interactive “networked audience.”202 In radio or television broadcasts, one-
way content is institutionally created and directed at a passive audience of consumers. A 
networked audience, on the other hand, is active and connected.203 Social media allows for 
participants to both send and receive information in an interactive manner.204 Audience members 
participate in the creation of content by adding comments, posting photos, liking, sharing, or 
“retweeting” posts and comments provided by others.   
   As a result of this constant interaction, the social media manager is not only a content 
producer, but also a mediator of the evolving content and relationships that emerge. Social media 
audiences influence the content an individual produces, and affect how the manager crafts her 
evolving image. In other words, the audience becomes part of the process of constructing a social 
media persona.205 A social media audience becomes so closely tied to the user’s persona that the 
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two cannot be separated. It is also highly fluid, changing constantly as individuals and content 
are added or removed.206  
E.D. The Social Media Manager Often Works Across Personal and Professional Contexts 
Social media renders the line between the professional and personal undeniably blurry. Social 
media users manage multiple audiences from different life contexts (childhood friends, 
professional contacts, family, etc.) in a single online platform for varied reasons. Given the 
unwieldiness and time-consuming nature of managing multiple social media profiles, some 
choose to consolidate into a single profile or site for efficiency or convenience. Additionally, the 
very structure or terms of the sites may force users to intermingle audiences.207  
   For the avid social media audience manager aiming to broaden his social media presence, 
this amalgamation may prove useful as it increases his followers, activity, and reach. On the 
other hand, the erasure of the fine distinctions among audiences may result in what has been 
referred to as “context collapse.”208 Context collapse involves the forced merging of social and 
professional contexts, making the individual unable to differentiate self-presentation online.209 
As a result, some users may adjust their behavior “so as to make it appropriate for a variety of 
different situations and audiences;”210 others may simply suffer the social repercussions that 
ensue from dissonant self-presentations.  
   In addition, employees may intentionally meld personal contacts to increase visibility and 
networking ability, or may import contacts accumulated prior to their current efforts on behalf of 
an employer. For example, in the Mattocks case, prior to employment, Mattocks had personally 
created and managed a fan page devoted to a BET show. Upon joining BET’s marketing effort, 
she amalgamated her prior fan base (amounting to 2 million likes) to her work for BET.211 The 
result was a highly successful fan page with ambiguous ownership, which BET ultimately took 
as its own.  
F.E. A Social Media Audience Has Social and Financial Value 
A social media audience carries value in terms of social currency, reputation, and personal 
                                                 
206 Alice Marwick & Nicole B. Ellison, “There Isn’t Wifi in Heaven!” Negotiating Visibility on Facebook Memorial 
Pages, 56 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 378, 378 (2012) (“Social media such as Facebook make 
possible future audiences that may not be anticipated by the participants.”). 
207 For instance, LinkedIn and Facebook allow only one profile per person. See User Agreement, supra note 114, § 
2.1; Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 61, § 4.  
208 Marwick & boyd, supra note 201, at 122; see also Jessica Vitak et al., “Why Won’t You Be My Facebook 
Friend?”: Strategies for Managing Context Collapse in the Workplace, http://www-
personal.umich.edu/~enicole/VitakLampeGrayEllison_iConf2012.pdf; Bernie Hogan, The Presentation of Self in the 
Age of Social Media: Distinguishing Performances and Exhibitions Online, 30 BULL. SCI. TECH. & SOC’Y 377, 383 
(2010).  
209 Marwick & boyd, supra note 201, at 122.  
210 Dawn R. Gilpin, Working the Twittersphere: Microblogging as Professional Identity Construction, in A 
NETWORKED SELF: IDENTITY, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE ON SOCIAL NETWORK SITES 233 (Zizi Papacharissi ed., 
2011) (citation omitted).  
211 Mattocks v. Black Entm’t Television, LLC, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1311, 1315–16 (S.D. Fla. 2014). 
28 Vol. 53  /  American Business Law Journal 
 
brand.212 Interaction with social media audiences can result in social and dignitary benefits for the 
individual collector. On a basic level, the individual may experience the relational welfare 
stemming from strengthened individual bonds and fulfillment at being at the nucleus of a 
networked group.  
Both the social media manager and the business he promotes can also gain significant 
social capital and business goodwill from a wide, heterogeneous audience.213 Research 
conducted by Bain & Company found that customers who engage businesses on social media 
spend twenty percent to forty percent more with those businesses than other customers and feel 
greater loyalty to the businesses with which they connect.214 Other sources have calculated the 
potential value to the business sector from effective use of social networks to between $900 
billion and $1.3 trillion a year.215As Marwick observes, upgrading social status through 
popularity and influence often drives online participation.216 Acknowledging this need, most 
social networking sites employ indicators of status and importance, such as Facebook “likes” and 
Twitter “retweets.”217 Researchers have noted that individuals with an online influence can 
benefit from resources such as access to useful information, access to individuals outside their 
own circle, and elevated social status.218 For the individual, this creates professional goodwill, 
which can result in concrete benefits such as business and employment connections.219 
Businesses enjoy their own distinct advantages. Enhanced relationships with a broad network of 
consumers can strengthen reputation, engage current and future customers, and generate profit.  
Google Executive Chairman Eric Schmidt refers to online identity as both “commodity” 
and “currency.”220 He suggests that in the future, “[i]dentity will be the most valuable 
commodity for citizens . . . and it will exist primarily online. . . . We are what we tweet.”221 For 
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all of the reasons outlined in the preceding paragraphs, there is ample evidence that the future 
Schmidt envisions of online identity as a commodity is close, if not here. Marketing strategies 
once reserved for companies are being applied to individuals. An entire industry has developed 
around self-branding—assisting individuals in creating a successful identity with which to 
market themselves widely.222  
Further evidencing the rising value of online identity, social media has led to the 
democratization of celebrity. Scholars have loosely defined fame as “the informal attribution of 
distinction on an individual within a given social network.”223 In the twentieth century, 
businesses began to manufacture individuals’ fame as a commodity that was leveraged for 
profit.224 Few could attain the level of notoriety that would result in an identity with commercial 
value.  
Today, social media has changed the dynamic of the manufacturing and distribution of 
celebrity, facilitating a phenomenon known as “micro-celebrity.” Micro-celebrity is “the 
phenomenon of being extremely well known not to millions but to a small group,” a few 
thousand or even a few dozen people.225 Micro-celebrity, like self-branding, is a construction of 
identity that can be consumed by others with the audience acting as a fan base.226 This identity 
draws a fan base that can be used to promote one’s self and monetized through sponsored 
promotions.227 Internet scholars have noted that the concept of micro-celebrity “implies that all 
individuals have an audience that they can strategically maintain through ongoing 
communication and interaction.”228  
Anecdotes abound of people promoting themselves through social media, garnering a 
following, and translating that self-made fame into lucrative careers.229 One commentator has 
observed that this path to success has become “well-trodden.”230 For example, Michelle Phan, a 
YouTube blogger known for her homemade make-up instruction videos, launched a commercial 
empire that includes her own line of makeup, a music label, and a lifestyle site.231   
Despite Schmidt’s statements and conventional wisdom about the value of identity, some 
courts and commentators have struggled with attaching value to online identity and social media 
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audiences.232 Linda Eagle’s former employer locked her out of her LinkedIn account, causing 
search results for her name to be redirected to her successor’s page. Although the court held in 
her favor, it did not award her damages because it held that she could not prove a loss of 
value.233 Some courts have refused to attach value to what they view as an indeterminate 
reputational matter or an impermanent asset.234 In other words, since social media platforms 
allow members to unilaterally disconnect from the networked group at any time, some have 
argued that it is a non-static list incapable of ownership and assessable value.235  
Interestingly, however, both bankruptcy courts and the financial industry have recognized 
the value of social media presence and audiences, no matter now changeable or intangible. The 
recent bankruptcy cases discussed previously in Part I involving the ownership and valuation of 
social media profiles conclude that the administrative privileges and associated digital rights are 
bona fide assets and business goodwill.236 The Maremont court also recognized value in the 
plaintiff’s Twitter and Facebook followers, noting that they were “a marketable commercial 
interest.”237   
Well-established financial standards and metrics also quantify the value of networked 
audiences. For instance, some general valuation models divide the number of users on a platform 
by the company’s valuation to determine the monetary value of each user.238 PhoneDog, in its 
case against Kravitz, argued that industry standards valued each Twitter follower at $2.50 per 
month.239 Other valuation metrics capture factors such as relationships between users, 
connections of users, and loyalty of users, rather than just numbers.240  
With an understanding of the many claims involved and the burgeoning meaning and 
value of social media audiences in firmer grasp, the next part proposes that publicity rights, a 
hybrid of privacy and property law, is an appropriate lens through which to analyze the harm that 
employees suffer when their digital identities and work product are usurped. 
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III. USING PUBLICITY RIGHTS RATIONALE TO DETERMINE POST-
EMPLOYMENT SOCIAL MEDIA CONTROL  
As we have shown above, courts have had difficulty resolving employment cases involving 
social media retention and balancing competing interests.241 They have analyzed the issues 
through the lenses of trade secret, personal property, privacy, and intellectual property rights to 
little avail. Given that social media is laborious, creative, and often tied to its manager’s 
personality, this section argues that the law of publicity rights offers a fuller, more accurate 
foundation for the analysis of the post-employment control of social media accounts. As a well-
established quasi-property claim in identity, publicity rights protect the economic fruit of a 
person’s name and identity. Justified in publicity rights, we contend that individuals should be 
entitled to protection against those who seek to misappropriate their work, personae, and 
goodwill for economic gain, except when their work falls squarely in the scope of their 
employment. However, as discussed in Part II, disentangling the personal from the professional 
and defining the scope of employment requires surgical precision in the modern world. As such, 
we propose a framework for application of publicity rights to this novel employment context. 
Inspired by the precepts of agency and publicity law, our proposed rubric balances the 
employee’s financial, social, and emotional interests in his social media while balancing the 
employer’s legitimate business claims.     
A. Applying Publicity Rights to Social Media Personae 
The right of publicity is a relatively new quasi-property right that grew out of the privacy tort of 
commercial appropriation.242 Historically, an appropriation claim sought recovery for the 
dignitary and emotional harms that result from unauthorized appropriation of a person’s 
likeness.243 However, as the practice of celebrity endorsements in advertising grew in the latter 
half of the twentieth century, it became clear that the identity of public figures carried 
commercial value—apart from the privacy interests protected by the appropriation tort.244 An 
early seminal New York case involved the unauthorized use of the images of major league 
baseball players in baseball cards.245 The Second Circuit found—for the first time—that 
individuals had a property right in their own images.246  
Celebrities clamored for the protection of this intangible asset, which could not be 
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justified in privacy alone.247 One argument that was particularly persuasive in favor of the new 
tort was that the time and effort that celebrities invested in themselves carried a real, protectable 
value.248 As a result, a handful of states led the emergence of a new tort, the right of publicity, 
which takes a property-based view of the right to one’s likeness, persona, and reputation.249  
Scholars have extensively debated the tort’s theoretical underpinnings.250 What justifies the 
prevention of the unauthorized commercial appropriation of a valuable persona? One common 
moral justification for the right centers upon Lockean labor considerations: the person who puts 
time and energy into creating value in his image is justified in owning the fruit of his labor, 
reaping its benefits, and preventing others from unjustly enriching from it.251 Economic 
rationales for the right are utilitarian in nature, as economic incentives promote creativity and 
progress and protect consumers from deception.252 Others point to the importance of individual 
dignity and autonomy as the driving force for publicity rights.253 Theories of personhood and 
autonomy justify publicity rights based upon the inherent link between the self and a person’s 
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right to control its presentation.254   
Today, over thirty states recognize publicity rights, either through common law255 or by 
statute.256 The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition sets forth the four elements of a right 
of publicity claim. A claimant must show that (1) the defendant used the plaintiff’s identity (2) 
for the defendant’s commercial (or other) advantage (3) without the plaintiff’s consent, (4) 
causing injury.257     
Over the past forty years, the right of publicity has experienced a significant expansion. 
Traditionally, courts had held that only name and likeness were the proper indicia of identity to 
support a right of publicity claim.258 However, over the years, jurisdictions, led by the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, expanded the indicia of identity to recognize a broader concept of 
identity, such as “name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness.”259 One famous case held that 
the mere evocation of a person’s signature role as a game show model violated her publicity 
rights.260  
Given the justifications and the expanded scope of the modern right of publicity, its 
application to social media is logical. Outside of the employment context, various scholars have 
made this argument persuasively.261 A social media profile can be an extension of its creator’s 
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persona and will likely include indicia of identity such as name and likeness, as demonstrated by 
the four social media cases discussed earlier. Like traditional celebrities, these employees put in 
considerable time and effort in their personae. Like the historical justification for granting 
celebrities publicity rights, there is economic value in their work, their reputations, and their 
following.262 From a Lockean perspective, they should enjoy the fruits of their labor, which, as 
established above, is quite intensive and encompassing in its dynamism. In their capacity as 
thought-disseminators, social media managers may also carry high endorsement value with their 
trusted audiences. The plaintiffs in PhoneDog, Maremont, and Mattocks each made their living 
by sharing their opinions and endorsements in a signature style. Their audiences followed them, 
seeking out their particular expertise and musings. There is little doubt in the business world that 
the plaintiffs’ actions carried value. In fact, the four employers’ actions (in usurping the social 
media post-employment) are a recognition of this value. However, both Eagle and Maremont 
failed to remunerate the wronged employees based on their right to publicity. While it 
acknowledged that Eagle had made a prima facie showing of publicity rights, the Eagle court had 
trouble with the concept that the temporary hijacking of the employee’s LinkedIn could have 
caused damage—and in fact sought proof that actual damage had occurred.263 The Maremont 
court concluded that the employer’s act of communicating through an employee’s Facebook 
page without her consent was not an unjust appropriation of her identity.  
While the majority of courts today recognize that publicity rights are available to all 
individuals (regardless of their fame), they often struggle conceptualizing of value of the rights 
of non-traditional celebrities or nonpublic figures.264 As more nonpublic individuals garner 
personality value through their social media efforts, we will likely see more such cases. These 
cases illustrate the need for a clear rubric to apply publicity rights in the context of social media 
employment cases. 
B. The Employee’s Persona Versus the Employer’s Asset: A Multi-Factor Analysis for 
Determining Post-Employment Retention of Social Media    
As mentioned above, the four elements of a right of publicity claim are that (1) the defendant 
used the plaintiff’s identity (2) for the defendant’s commercial (or other) advantage (3) without 
                                                 
McGeveran advocates a “persona rights” paradigm for digital identities, based on a combination of privacy and 
intellectual property law. McGeveran, supra note 250, at 1149–55. Similarly, Daniel Nemet-Nejat proposes that 
courts should apply the copyright theory of separability to determine what parts of an online persona should be 
protected. Nemet-Nejat, supra note 205, at 130. Mark Conrad proposes a standard to determine the parameters of a 
right of publicity action that would grant a constitutional privilege for depictions of actual people unless the use is 
for a “sole commercial purpose.” Conrad, supra note 242, at 799; see also Dora Georgescu, Note, Two Tests Unite 
to Resolve the Tension Between the First Amendment and the Right of Publicity, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 907, 909 
(2014) (proposing a “transformative use” test to determine whether an author’s creative work which uses the 
likeness of another has enough creative elements to be considered expression worthy of First Amendment 
protection). Each of the articles relate to the free speech issues that arise when online personae are used by another 
for social media marketing or artistic purposes, which is outside the scope of this inquiry. Our focus is different and 
narrower—employment law and the right to keep relationships that have become inextricably connected to the 
persona.    
262 See generally Barbas, supra note 243. 
263 See supra text accompanying notes 51–54. 
264 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 4:14 (2d ed. 2009). 




the plaintiff’s consent, (4) causing injury.265 In the employment context, it is clear that employers 
often have the right—whether implicit or explicit—to use their employees’ identities for their 
commercial advantage. However, the world of social medial is replete with blurred boundaries 
and context collapse.266 More than ever employees mix contacts, worlds, and behavior, 
sometimes resulting in a lack of clarity regarding whether the employer used the employee’s 
identity wrongfully, without his consent, and caused injury. 
The following five-part analysis is intended to provide specific factors that courts could 
consider to determine the proper post-employment fate of a mixed-use social media account. The 
rubric is structured with five overarching themes, each undergirded by a series of questions. The 
themes to examine are: (1) the purpose and nature of the employment relationship; (2) the 
purpose and nature of the social media account, including its creation; (3) the employer’s access 
or control of the social media account; (4) the degree to which the employee’s persona is infused 
in the forum; and (5) the injury caused by the employer’s alleged infringement. We address each 
theme and factor in detail below.267 
1. Employment Purpose and Relationship 
An analysis to determine administrative rights to a social media profile and audience begins by 
looking at the reasons for which the employee was hired and the nature of the employee’s job. 
Thus, if an employee was hired for a marketing or communications-related post, or was primarily 
responsible for creating and maintaining social media relationships for the employer, these facts 
would weigh in favor of employer retention. A court should ask whether building or maintaining 
a social media audience on behalf of the employer was a critical part of the employee’s job 
description. In PhoneDog v. Kravitz, the employee was hired to be a video blogger, reviewing 
products and sharing his views on Twitter.268 Although the employee eventually became a micro-
celebrity to his followers, this factor would weigh heavily against his continued retention and 
control of the social media.  
On the other hand, if the creation of a social media audience was not part of the 
employee’s work duties, and the employee used a primarily personal social media account to 
promote the employer’s business only occasionally, those facts would indicate that the employer 
did not have the automatic right to use the employee’s identity—and administrative rights would 
rightfully belong to the employee. In Eagle v. Morgan, an education executive sued for the return 
of her social media after it was hijacked by her former company.269 The executive’s employment 
was not premised or contingent on her social media involvement, nor was social media 
interaction her obligation; hence, this factor would weigh in her favor. 
Thus, questions courts might consider under this first prong include: 
 Was building or maintaining a social media presence on behalf of the employer a 
critical part of the employee’s job description? Alternatively, did the employee 
                                                 
265 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1995); see also supra note 257. 
266 See supra text accompanying notes 207–210. 
267 The themes and factors are also set forth in infra Appendix A. 
268 No. C 11-03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011). 
269 No. 11-4303, 2013 WL 943350, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013). 
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promote the company on social media as a secondary consideration or out of 
loyalty to the employer? 
 Was the employee hired for a marketing or communications-related post?  
 Was the employee hired with the understanding that she would contribute or 
import her existing social media presence to the company? 
2. Purpose and Nature of the Social Media Account 
Courts should also consider the purpose and nature of the account, including the facts 
surrounding its creation. This analysis first considers whether the employee or the employer 
created the account. If the employee’s job required maintenance of an account that had been set 
up before employment began, that would weigh in favor of the employer’s continued right to the 
audience associated with it. Similarly, if an employee’s existing account(s) and social media 
audience were important factors in her hiring, and the employee brought a majority of the social 
media audience with her when she began working for the employer, then the presumption would 
be that the employee is entitled to keep the administrative rights to the profile and its associated 
audience when employment ends.   
If the employee created the account after becoming employed, then courts must carefully 
consider the circumstances surrounding its creation, including who set up the account and whose 
name is associated with it. Employees who create social media profiles on their own behalves 
unrelated to their job description have a stronger claim to the account. Timing and location may 
also be factors. An employee who creates an account during employment may be considered to 
be acting as an agent for the employer, and thus could have a weaker claim to the associated 
audience when she leaves. On the other hand, if the employee created the account on her own, 
this may be indicative that the employee should retain access rights.270 For instance, in the 
PhoneDog case, Kravitz claimed “that he created the account on his own initiative to promote his 
freelance work, including the freelance work he was doing for PhoneDog.”271 If such facts are 
true, this presumption should apply particularly if the account was used primarily for personal 
reasons.272   
The name and e-mail account officially associated with the account is also an important 
factor. If the account is set up in the employee’s name only, as was Linda Eagle’s,273 the 
presumption should be that the account remains within the employee’s control. In Maremont, the 
                                                 
270 See Argento, supra note 11, at 268; Balasubramani, supra note 109 (“To the extent there were . . . legitimate 
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fact that the employee had set up the account under her name won the day for the employee, who 
was the victor.274   
Facebook in particular provides settings that allow users to keep information private, 
including friend lists.275 However, the default setting is that “everyone” can see the friends 
associated with a particular account.276 Thus, if an employee creates and maintains an account in 
his own name, and affirmatively changes the privacy settings so that public viewing is restricted, 
and the employer has no access to the account to change these settings or see private posts, this 
would weigh in the employee’s favor. 
In addition to the circumstances surrounding the creation of the account, the type and 
nature of the account at issue is also relevant, as it can indicate the intentions of its creator.277 A 
personal timeline on Facebook displays an individual’s identity and stands in contrast to a 
Facebook page which represents businesses, organizations, or a celebrity’s public profile. The 
creation of a personal timeline may therefore indicate a personal rather than professional focus to 
the user’s account. LinkedIn provides personal accounts, group pages, and also an option for 
corporate accounts that are managed by one particular person.278 However, LinkedIn tends to be 
used more for business-related purposes, while Twitter and Facebook accounts are often highly 
personal.279 Courts must have the ability to properly distinguish between these various options in 
context.   
Thus, questions courts might consider under this second prong include: 
 Why was the social media forum created? 
 Did the employee create the social media profile in question? If so, on whose 
behalf? Or alternatively, did the employee inherit the forum? 
 Is the social media forum predominantly personal or job-related in nature? 
 What are the privacy settings on the account? 
 What is the prevalent purpose of the social media platform (e.g., personal or 
business) and its particular format (Profile, fan page, TimeLine, etc.)? 
 Did the employee bring the majority of the social media audience with him when 
he began working for the employer? 
3. Employer Access and Control   
Employer access and control of the social media accounts is a third significant element in the 
                                                 
274 Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., No. 10 C 7811, 2014 WL 812401, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2014). 
275 See Timeline Privacy, Who Can See the Friends Section of my Timeline, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/www/115450405225661 (last visited Mar. 17, 2016). 
276 Id.   
277 Argento, supra note 11, at 268; see also Balasubramani, supra note 109 (“[I]t’s crucial for courts to distinguish 
between the different types of accounts.”) (comment by Erik Goldman); Richardson, supra note 150, at 124 
(“Facebook in general and the individual Facebook profile in question must be understood before a decision can be 
rendered regarding how the profile should be divided between the spouses and valued.”). 
278 See Requirements for Adding Company Pages, supra note 187. 
279 See Sullivan, supra note 193 (suggesting that the difference between a Twitter account, which is often highly 
personality-based, and a LinkedIn account, which is often simply a list of business connections, may dictate the 
employer’s arguments in favor of the right to access the account). 
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analysis. Here, courts will look at the level of authority the employer maintains over the accounts 
in question. If part of the employee’s job was to cultivate a social media audience, did the 
employer give guidance as to that presence? Did the employer openly monitor or control the 
subject forum and postings? The answers to these questions relate to whether maintenance of the 
account in question was part of the employee’s job duties and are closely related to the first two 
factors. An employer who requires the employee to create a Facebook account, for instance, may 
be more likely to impose rules on the maintenance of that account.   
Courts should also consider who has access to the account and passwords. An employer 
who has insisted on having administrative rights or maintaining control of the social media 
accounts or their login information would have a strong argument that the accounts are primarily 
work-related.280 For example, in the Mattocks case, the employee was hired for her social media 
presence and skill in promoting a BET show on Facebook.281 Upon her employment, she 
consented to allowing her employer administrative rights to the fan page over which she 
previously had sole control.282 This act evidences clear consent and weighs in favor of the cable 
network. If more than one employee worked on an account, it is likely that the parties did not 
contemplate that any one employee would have an exclusive right to the account, but if only one 
employee managed the account this may favor the employee.283   
Thus, questions courts might consider under this third prong include:     
 Did the employer require employees to maintain and cultivate a social media 
audience?  
 Did the employer give guidance as to the employee’s social media presence?  
 Did the employer monitor or control the subject forum and postings? 
 Did the employer impose rules regarding the subject social media account? 
 Did the employer legitimately have administrative rights or password 
information? 
 Did more than one employee have access to edit and change the account? 
4. Employee Persona   
                                                 
280 Rebecca Bentz, Employer vs. Employee: Who Owns Social Media?, WORKPLACE HR & SAFETY 
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Employees should have a strong claim to social media they created and infused with their own 
identity and for the purposes of socialization or personal networking. This factor in the analysis 
requires a close look at the employee’s online persona and presence. As mentioned above, many 
social media audiences are amassed largely through a person’s individual expressions of 
personality, wit, expertise, or flair.284 The stronger the employee’s online identity or indicia of 
identity, the greater should be the presumption that the employee is entitled to retention. 
Reflective of publicity rights, this presumption reflects the value of the employee’s online 
persona and prevents the employer from trading on or misappropriating the employee’s identity.    
Thus, questions courts might consider under this fourth prong include: 
 Does the social media forum identify the employee by name? 
 Is the forum infused with the personality and identity of the employee? Was it 
representative of the individual? 
 Did the employee enjoy social media recognition or notoriety independent of the 
employer? 
 Did the employee write or create the majority of his or her own content?  
 Did the employee amass the social media audience under his or her own name or 
was he or she writing anonymously or pseudonymously on behalf of the 
employer?  
Employees who attract social media audiences through a variety of accounts have a 
particularly persuasive argument for publicity rights.   
5. Degree of Injury 
Finally, if courts are to apply publicity rights to remedy social media employees, they must 
broaden their views of celebrity and injury to publicity rights to meet contemporary notions and 
established law. In 2015, the District Court for the Eastern Division of Illinois held that a grocery 
chain infringed basketball-great Michael Jordan’s publicity rights when it published a print ad in 
a 2009 commemorative edition of Sports Illustrated magazine congratulating Mr. Jordan on his 
induction to the Basketball Hall of Fame.285 The mere association of the business with the 
famous man—even in a congratulatory context—without his consent triggered a judgment 
against the defendant of $8.9 million.286 In contrast, social media employees who have contested 
their publicity rights have come away with no damages, even when they successfully made a 
prima facie showing of a violation to their publicity rights.287 
Existing law provides that the measure of damages for a publicity rights violation is the 
“fair market value of the property right in plaintiff’s identity which defendant has used without 
                                                 
284 See supra text accompanying notes 194–202.  
285 Jordan v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, 115 F. Supp. 3d 950 (N.D. Ill. 2015). In another case with similar facts, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that a similar advertisement run by Jewel-Osco supermarkets constituted 
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Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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permission.”288 For celebrities, such a market value is often ascertained by expert testimony as to 
comparables: “amounts received by comparable persons for comparable uses.”289 For non-
celebrities, the calculus should be similar, without bias.  
Thus, questions courts might consider under this fifth prong include: 
 Did the employee’s identity have a fair market value independent of his 
employer? 
 If so, did the employer cause injury to the employee by usurping the employee’s 
identity without consent? 
 What is the fair market value of the employee’s contribution or identity? 
 How much would the employer likely pay to another to create what it took from 
the employee? 
The foregoing five-part analysis represents a step forward in thinking about the scope of 
celebrity and social media—and their value in the modern world. A view of information, as a 
hybrid between property and reputation, as Eric Schmidt suggests,290 will help courts fashion a 
legal framework that reflects the modern reality and understanding of social media. 
CONCLUSION 
“People don’t belong to people.”291 
Social media interactions are often an extension of the self. Yet they can also be sources of 
individual and corporate value. However, when it comes to the rights of employees to their social 
media, the law is conflicted and unclear. To date, litigants, courts, and commentators have miscast 
this issue, blurring it with a panoply of ill-fitting legal theories, from trade secret to conversion. At 
the core of these cases is the right to control a social media profile and to continue to interact with 
its audience, a desire inextricably intertwined with an individual’s personality and work product.  
With a firmer understanding of the prevalent norms of social media, we argue that 
reasoning grounded in publicity rights provides a better lens through which to view an employee’s 
social media activity: Individuals should be entitled to protection against those who seek to 
misappropriate their work, personae, and goodwill for economic gain, except when their work falls 
squarely in the scope of their employment. On that basis, this article proposes an analysis that 
applies publicity rights and balances the employee’s professional and dignitary interests against 
the employer’s commercial concerns. It is only by taking into account the reality of social media 
interaction, its value on multiple levels, and each party’s legitimate expectations that we can begin 
to balance the many interests that compete for social media’s innovative assets and update the law 
to reflect our modern reality.  
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APPENDIX A – MULTIFACTOR QUESTIONS 
Factor One Questions: 
 Did the employee create the social media profile in question? If so, on whose behalf? Or 
alternatively, did the employee inherit the forum? 
 Is the social media forum predominantly personal or job-related in nature? 
 The nature of the social media platform (i.e. LinkedIn, Facebook, and so on), and 
whether more than one social media account is at issue. 
Factor Two Questions: 
 Was building a social media audience on behalf of the employer a critical part of the 
employee’s job description? Was the employee hired for a marketing or communications-
related post? 
 Was the employee’s social media audience a factor in his or her hiring? Did the employee 
bring the majority of the social media audience with him when he began working for the 
employer? 
 Would it matter which party was acting to terminate the relationship? 
Factor Three Questions: 
 Did the employer require employees to maintain and cultivate a social media audience? 
Did the employer give guidance as to the employee’s social media presence? Did the 
employer openly monitor or control the subject forum and postings? 
 Whether the content that is posted is publicly available, or whether the employee also 
relied upon privacy settings in some cases to limit access 
 Whether the employer required access to the account - username and password info. 
Factor Four Questions: 
 Is the social media forum infused with the personality and identity of the employee? Was 
it representative of the individual? 
 Did the employee have other social media accounts? 
 Did the employee enjoy social media recognition or notoriety independent of the 
employer? 
 Did the employee write or create the majority of his/her own content?  
 Did the employee amass the social media audience under his or her own name or was he 
or she writing anonymously or pseudonymously on behalf of the employer?  
Factor Five Questions: 
 Did the employee’s identity have a fair market value independent of his employer? 
 If so, did the employer cause injury to the employee by usurping the employee’s identity 
without consent? 
 What is the fair market value of the employee’s contribution or identity? 
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 How much would the employer likely pay to another to create what it took from the 
employee? 
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